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ABSTRACT
UNITED STATES-AFGHANISTAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1979:
Hafizullah Amin's Struggle For Survival 
During the 19th and early 20th centuries Afghanistan remained a 
buffer zone between Czarist Russia and B r it ish  India. The struggle between 
these two powers to control the region or at least to  deny such a control 
to  th e ir  r iva l was called "The Great Game.” When the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 , the U.S. Charge d 'A ffa ires  in Kabul 
wrote in .a telegram addressed to Washington " . . . th e  Great Game is  ove r."1
The Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan was the most recent Russian 
ambitious act to  extend th e ir  control beyond th e ir  southern border. The 
Soviet control over Afghanistan lasted fo r more than a decade. From 1978 
to  1986 four presidents ruled Afghanistan. A l l ,  except Hafizullah Amin, 
were in s ta lled  and supported by the Soviet Government. President Amin, 
who forced himself to  power by elim inating Noor Mohammad Tarak i, ruled 
Afghanistan fo r one hundred and three days.
The shaky re lations between President Amin and the Soviet leaders 
forced Amin to reduce, his dependency on the Soviet Union and also to 
prevent fu rthe r Soviet influence in Afghan a f fa irs .  In order to achieve 
his goals and to assure his surv iva l, Amin t r ie d  to established closer 
re la tions with other countries, especially with Pakistan and the United 
States. Amin could neither improve his re lations with the Soviet Union
A u th o r ita r ia n  Regimes in T rans itions. U.S. Department of States, Foreign 
Service In s t i tu te .  Washington, D.C., 1987. p. 80.
nor was he able to gain the t ru s t  of western countries including the 
United States government. His fa i le d  e f fo r ts  ended with his murder.
Amin’ s personality, his re lations with his predecessor Noor Mohammed 
Tarak i, and his re la tions with the United States is  the subject o f th is  
thesis. This research also focuses on the factors contribu ting to the 
invasion o f Afghanistan and Hafizullah Amin’ s search fo r surv iva l.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Afghanistan: Historical Background
Afghan emperor Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747, named Afghanistan, 
meaning the land o f the Afghans.1 Afghanistan previously had been 
called Aryana in the pre-medieval period and Khurasan during the Middle 
Ages. No h is to r ica l records ex is t concerning the people who lived in 
th is  region p r io r  to the Aryans s e t t l in g  in Balkh (Bactr ia ), a c i t y  in 
northern Afghanistan, around 3000 B. C. The Aryans b u i l t  c i t ie s ,  
established an elementary form of democratic government, and composed 
the Rigvedic hymns, th e ir  f i r s t  l i te ra ry  work, in Afghanistan about 
2000-1400 B.C.2
H isto rica l records reveal that Afghanistan had been a cross-road 
between "East" and "West," and i t  was in th is  land that d i f fe re n t  races 
and various cultures and c iv i l iz a t io n s  met. Afghanistan’ s geographical 
location attracted numerous invading armies since i t s  very early 
h is to ry . Indeed, Afghanistan has been invaded more than any other 
nation in the world.3
Among the invading forces was the army of Alexander the Great. In 
330 B.C. he entered Afghanistan on his way to  conquer India. A fte r  his 
death in 327 B.C., the Greek se tt le rs  in Balkh established a strong 
government and ruled Afghanistan fo r some two hundred years. In the 
th ird  century B.C. Ashoka the Great ruled Afghanistan and i t  became a 
part o f his empire. Beginning with the second century B.C. a f te r  the 
Ashoka empire weakened, various invaders, such as Scythians, Parthians, 
the Kushans, the Ephthalites and the White Huns conquered and ruled th is  
country. During the seventh and eight centuries A.D. the Arabs invaded 
Afghanistan. Although they fa iled  to conquer the en tire  country, the
2Islamic cu lture and Islamic re l ig ion  became a dominant feature o f the 
people. In the th ir teen th  century the invading armies o f Genghis Khan 
destroyed the country and k i l le d  m illions of people.4
From 1370 to 1506, Afghanistan was ruled by the Timurid Dynasty. 
A fte r the Timurids weakened, the Monghuls and the Safavid ruled in 
Afghanistan u n t i l  1747.5 In 1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani la id  the 
foundation o f a strong central government in Afghanistan. However, 
a f te r  his death in 1793, a power struggle began among his descendants. 
C iv i l  wars crushed the country and Afghanistan became weak. While 
Afghanistan was becoming weaker, the B r it ish  empire in India was gaining 
ground on i t s  eastern border.
During the 19th century, the weakened Afghanistan was caught 
between two powerful im peria lis t r iva ls ,  Great B r ita in  and Russia. Both 
were eager to expand th e ir  sphere of influence and occupy more 
t e r r i t o r ie s  in the area. The r iv a lry  between these two, called "The 
Great Game," increased when the Russians continued to expand th e ir  
southern border and occupied the small khanates in the Central Asia .6 
Tashkent was taken by the Russians in 1865, Samarkand in 1868, Kokand in 
1871, Khiva in 1873, Ashkabad in 1881, and Merv in 1884. Panjdeh was 
taken from Afghanistan in 1885.7
Observing the Russian expansion in Central Asia, the B r i t is h  were 
concerned about the Russian advance toward India through Afghanistan, as 
Herat, a western c i t y  in Afghanistan, was considered the gateway to 
India. Afghanistan, as a buffer zone between the two powers, suffered 
the loss o f i t s  te r r i to r ie s  as a resu lt o f im peria lis t expansion at her 
borders. In the nineteenth century Great B rita in  invaded Afghanistan
twice, in 1839, and then again in 1879. The Afghans defeated the 
B r i t is h  army in 1839. However, a f te r  the 1879 war Afghanistan and Great 
B r ita in  signed the Treaty o f Gandumak. The Treaty recognized 
Afghanistan as a sovereign state, and the B r it ish  government paid the 
Afghan .monarch an annual stipend, in return the B r it ish  government 
received the control o f Afghanistan's foreign a f fa irs .  Subsequently the 
B r i t is h  annexed a large area of eastern Afghanistan to  B r it ish  In d ia .8
Afghanistan, weak now as a resu lt of her wars with B r ita in  and 
Russia, needed a strong central government. Amir Abdul Rahman (1880- 
1901) then became the ru le r in Afghanistan and devoted his e f fo r ts  to 
bu ild ing a strong government in Kabul. He conquered several t r ib e s , 
including the Hazaras and Kafirs and brought them under the control of 
the central government.9
A fte r the death o f Amir Abdul Rahman in 1901, his son Habibullah 
(1901-1919) ascended the throne of Kabul. During his eighteen years 
reign he wished to modernize Afghanistan during the World War I. 
Afghanistan remained neutral during that war. Afghan in te l le c tu a ls  
believed tha t the western world was "capable of se lf-des truc tion" and 
thus could not assist them in build ing a modern society. They 
therefore, refused to get assistance from the eastern world .10
On February 20, 1919, an unknown assailant assassinated Amir 
Habibullah in Kalagosh o f Laghman during a hunting t r i p . 11 Amanullah, 
the Amir’ s son was in Kabul at the time of the assassination. In the 
absence of his fa ther, Amanullah was Commander-in-Chief o f the Army, and 
served as the regent in Kabul. Upon learning the news o f his fa th e r ’ s
4death, Amanullah declared himself king o f Afghanistan. At the same 
time, as Amanullah was claiming the throne in Kabul, his uncle 
Nasrullah, supported by Amanullah’ s brothers in his claim, declared 
himself Amir o f Afghanistan in Jalalabad. This power struggle among the 
family members o f a ru ling  clan in Afghanistan was.not an unusual 
s itua t ion . And i t  often ended in c iv i l  wars, murders and bloodshed in 
addition to a weak government. The young Amanullah at age 19, succeeded 
in defeating his r iva l Nasrullah, and became king in Afghanistan.12 On 
February 28, Amanullah arrested Nasrullah, and sentenced him to l i f e  in 
prison in connection'with the murder of Amir Habibullah.13
Although i t  was not known who had murdered the Amir, and what 
exactly the motive was behind the murder, many were accused of 
p a rt ic ip a t in g  in his murder p lo t and were punished. The Russians blamed 
the B r it is h  fo r h ir ing  Mustafa Saghir as an assassin, and the Afghans 
o f f i c ia l l y  acknowledged th is  version. Mutafa Saghir was la te r  arrested 
in Ankara and accused o f p lo t t in g  to  murder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. In 
sp ite  o f the B r i t is h  e f fo r ts  to save his l i f e ,  Saghir was hanged in 
Ankara in 1922.14
A fte r King Amanullah (1919-1929) established himself as the sole 
ru le r  of Afghanistan by removing his r iva ls  from the p o l i t ic a l  scene, 
especially Nasrullah, he devoted_his e ffo r ts  to securing Afghanistan’ s 
complete independence from B r ita in . Although B r ita in  fa i le d  to  annex 
Afghanistan to th e ir  Indian empire in the two Anglo-Afghan wars, King 
Amanullah believed that B r i t is h  government had forced the Treaty of 
Gandumak on the Afghan Amir.
5Upon his accession in 1919, Amanullah declared that Afghanistan
was an independent country, and stated:
. . . th e  Government o f Afghanistan shall be 
in te rn a l ly  and externa lly  independent and free: 
tha t 1s to  say, a l l  r igh ts  o f Government that 
(are currently ) possessed by other independent 
powers o f the world shall be possessed in th e ir  
en t ire ty  by Afghanistan.15
Amanullah had the support and the encouragement o f Mahmoud T a rz i, 
his fa the r- in - law , who was a prominent Afghan na t io n a l is t  and an 
advocate of independence. When Amanullah was grieving a t.h is  fa th e r ’ s 
death, Mahmoud Tarzi to ld  him "Do not cry, now is  the time fo r  
a c t io n .1,16
At the time o f Afghan’ s newly declared independence, the B r it ish  
government was facing a number o f problems. World War I had ju s t  ended 
and England was s t i l l  t ry in g  to  recover from the war. In addition,
Great B r ita in  had s ig n if ica n t problems with the native people in India 
who were not happy with B r i t is h  rule and were engaged in a n t i -B r i t is h  
a c t iv i t ie s .  The Afghan monarch believed that the time was r ig h t  to  
secure Afghanistan’ s complete independence from Great B r ita in  while 
other problems occupied i t .
Amanullah was aware o f the B r i t is h  policy toward Afghanistan. He 
knew tha t the B r it is h  government would not surrender th e ir  au thority  to  
Afghanistan easily . Amanullah also knew that they would not accept the 
Afghan demand o f complete independence and would attempt to  re ta in  
control o f Afghan foreign po licy as long as they could. Amanullah 
wished to free Afghanistan completely from B r it ish  influence, then to 
modernize Afghanistan through a series of reforms. He hoped tha t the 
B r it is h  government would acknowledge Afghan independence through
6negotiation, without engaging Afghanistan in a war.
However, Amanullah without consulting the B r i t is h  government, 
conducted his country's foreign a f fa irs ,  and acted as a completely 
independent ru le r  as soon as he assumed power; He created a new 
Department o f State fo r  Afghanistan and appointed Mahmoud Tarzi as the 
head of the Department in charge of Afghan foreign a f fa i rs .  Tarzi 
informed the Foreign Secretary o f India that Afghan foreign re la tions 
would be conducted by the Afghans themselves through the Afghan 
Department o f S ta te .17
The Afghan leader wished to establish diplomatic re la tions with 
other nations. On April 7, 1919, King Amanullah sent iden tica l le t te rs  
to the Soviet Union, Japan, United States, France, Iran and Turkey 
sta ting  tha t: "This is  the f i r s t  time that I have had the good fortune 
o f sending (a) f r ie n d ly  le t te r  in the name of the Afghan n a t io n . . . ,  and 
on behalf o f the independent and free government of Afghanistan."18 
King Amanullah requested the establishment o f diplomatic re la tions with 
the formerly mentioned countries. By doing so they would formally 
acknowledge Afghanistan’ s independence.
The B r it is h  government refused to accept Amanullah’ s proclamation 
of independence and prepared fo r a war against the Afghans. To assure 
th e ir  success, the B r i t is h  wished to gain the support of the tr ibe s  
l iv in g  in India, east o f the Afghan border. S ir George Roos-Keppel, the 
B r i t is h  Chief Commissioner, was authorized to spend unlimited funds and 
to buy the lo ya lty  o f these tr ibes .
Amanullah launched a n t i-B r i t is h  campaigns in Afghanistan and in 
B r i t is h  India. B r ita in  wanted to delay the discussion o f Afghan
7independence, while Amanullah wanted to  gain Afghanistan’ s freedom 
quickly as he could. He wanted to in c ite  insurrection in the t r ib a l  
areas of the north-western f ro n t ie r  against the B r i t is h ,  and then send 
the Afghan army to jo in  the t r ib a l  groups in a march to  the Indian 
border.19
The B r it ish  delay in acknowledging Afghanistan independence 
resulted in the th ird  Anglo-Afghan war. On May 9, 1919, war began 
between Afghans and B r it ish  forces, and o f f i c ia l l y  ended on August 8, 
1919.20 On June 3, 1919, Afghanistan and B r ita in  agreed to  a cease 
f i r e .  A series of discussions between the two countries began a f te r  the 
cease f i r e .  B r ita in  accepted Afghan's demand fo r  independence and 
granted the Afghans f u l l  r ights to  th e ir  external and interna l a f fa irs .  
On August 8, 1919, Afghanistan and Great B r ita in  signed a trea ty  in 
Rawalpindi. Great B r ita in  recognized Afghanistan’ s complete 
i ndependence.21
On November 22, 1922, Mahmoud T a rz i, Chief o f the Delegation of 
the Afghan Government and Henry R. C. Dobbs, Envoy Extraordinary and 
Chief of the B r i t is h  Mission to Kabul signed another t rea ty  in Kabul, 
establishing diplomatic re lations between Afghanistan and B r it is h  
In d ia .22 In addition to  B r ita in , several other countries acknowledged 
Afghanistan’ s independence and established diplomatic re la tions with the 
country. The Soviet Union recognized Afghanistan’ s independence as soon 
as the Afghan monarch announced his country’ s independence. On March 
15, Izvestia published Afghanistan’ s declaration of independence, p r io r  
to  the Afghan and B r it is h  governments reaching a conclusive 
agreement.23
8In May, 1919, Vladimir H ich  Lenin responded to  Tarz i 's  le t te r  and
congratulated the Afghan king on his new government. The Soviet Union
was the f i r s t  country to recognize the independence o f Afghanistan and
to  send an ambassador to  Kabul. In February, 1921, a trea ty  of
fr iendsh ip was signed, between the governments o f Afghanistan and the
Soviet Union.24 Some historians believe that the reason fo r  the
Sov ie t’ s close re la tions with Afghanistan was the new Soviet
government’ s need fo r  in ternational a l l ie s .  Furthermore, the B r it ish
were supporting an ti-revo lu tionary  elements in the Soviet Union.25
King Amanullah ‘wished to establish diplomatic re la tions with a l l
countries. In sp ite  o f repeated requests by the Afghan leaders, the
United States did not give a posit ive  response to Amanullah and refused
to  consider Afghanistan an independent state. The U.S. government kept
the issue of recognition in doubt fo r some f i f te e n  years.26
In 1921, King Amanullah sent a high ranking diplomatic mission,
headed by General Gulam Mohammad Wali, as an extraordinary Ambassador,
to  Europe and the United States. On July 20, 1921, Wali met with
Secretary o f State Charles E. Hughes, and on July 26th he met with
President Warren G. Harding. Wali carried a le t te r  from King Amanullah
addressed to the President of the United States s ta t ing  tha t:
As I used to have the sincere wish to establish a 
permanent f r ie n d ly  re la tion  between Afghanistan and 
high government of the United States, I expect tha t 
Your Excellency’ s high government may by sa t is f ie d  
with the keeping of th is  f r ien d ly  re la t ion  to o .27
President Harding’ s le t te r  in response to  King Amanullah’ s le t te r  was 
t h a t :
9I t  is  my wish that the re lations between the United 
States and Afghanistan may always be o f a f r ie n d ly  
character, and I shall be happy to cooperate with Your
Majesty to th is  end. I am constrained, however, to
confirm to Your Majesty what was stated o ra l ly  to  Wali
Khan, tha t with respect to the United States, the
question o f the Creation o f Diplomatic Mission and o f 
appropriate action to that end by the Congress o f the 
United States must be reserved fo r fu rther 
consideration.28
However, King Amanullah did not give up, and in 1928, he planned a 
tour o f Europe during which he desired to include the United States. 
However, before his t r ip  to the U.S., the United States government 
informed him tha t: "his v i s i t  be u n o f f ic ia l,  at his own expense and that 
entertainment would be lim ited to lunch with President Coolidge."29 
Amanullah thereupon canceled his t r ip  to  the United State but continued 
with his European t r i p  where he was received with honor.
Although King Amanullah gained Afghanistan’ s independence and 
established diplomatic re lations with other countries, his reforms and 
modernization o f Afghanistan cost him his throne. Religious leaders and 
t r ib a l  groups resented his reforms and turned against Amanullah and his 
fam ily. Anti-government a c t iv i t ie s  began in Afghanistan with the 
burning o f the k ing ’ s palace and the B r it ish  consulate in Jalalabad in 
November, 1928. Revolt against the king increased and spread to other 
parts o f the country. The tr ibes formed an army and started marching 
toward Kabul. Amanullah sent his troops, but the troops instead o f 
f ig h t in g  the t r ib a l  army united with them against the Kabul government. 
The weak Kabul government became vulnerable to any attack. Habibullah 
(Bacha Saqqao) came from the north and attacked Kabul and gained control 
o f  the Kabul government. He ruled fo r nine months in Afghanistan during
10
which time he k i l le d  thousands o f people. Amanullah’ s e f fo r ts  to  regain 
his throne fa i le d , he le f t  the country and lived in ex i le  fo r  the rest 
o f his l i f e . 30
A fte r Amanullah’ s defeat, Mohammad Nadir Khan, a former army
general and Afghan Minister at Paris, with his two brothers, Mohammad
Hashim Khan and Shah Wali, came to India. There they gathered a t r ib a l
army returned to Afghanistan, and defeated Habibullah on October 10,
1929, ending his nine month regime of te r ro r  and bloodshed. The t r ib a l
army elected Nadir Khan as King o f Afghanistan.31
King Mohammad Nadir Khan (1929-1933) established a stable
government in Kabul. In 1931, through the Afghan Embassy in Rome, Nadir
Khan expressed his desire to establish diplomatic re la tions w ith .the
United States. Once again the United States’ response was negative.
The September 24, 1931, dispatch from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary o f
State, to  Alexander K irk, American Charge d 'A ffa ires  in I ta ly  stated the
American "reasons" fo r denying o f f ic ia l  diplomatic contact:
At your d iscretion you may o ra l ly  inform the M in is try  
o f Afghanistan tha t no recent consideration has been 
given by the government to  the question of the 
establishment o f o f f ic ia l  re la tions with the Afghan 
government and the present moment is not considered, to 
be opportune to negotiate a trea ty . I t  may be stated 
fo r  your own confidentia l information that the present 
request to  establish o f f ic ia l  re lations is  premature, 
since the present regime in Afghanistan has not yet 
been recognized by th is  government.32
In 1933, Abdul Khaliq, a student assassinated King Nadir Khan. 
Ghulam Nabi’ s family was Nadir Khan’ s ch ie f opponent; they hired Abdul 
Khaliq to assassinate Nadir Khan.33 Thus Nadir Khan’ s only son,
Mohammad Zahir (1933-1973) became king in Afghanistan. King Zahir also
11
requested the U.S. fo r an o f f ic ia l  recognition o f his government; again 
the United States denied the request. This denial was based on the 
recommendations of Wallace Murray, a Middle East expert in the State 
Department, whose knowledge of Afghanistan was very l im ite d .34
On April 24, 1934, King Mohammad Zahir, repeated his desire, once 
again, fo r  establishing diplomatic re lations between the United States 
and Afghanistan. F ina lly , the United States government granted 
recognition because; " . . .  the government of Afghanistan was recognized 
by a l l  o f the Great Powers, [and] the present government o f Afghanistan 
was a stable one."35 However, u n t i l  1942, no U.S. o f f ic ia l  resided in 
Afghanistan; on June 6, 1942, Cornelius Van H. Engert, became the f i r s t  
American M in ister to l iv e  in Afghanistan.36
The main reason fo r the U.S. delay in establishing diplomatic 
re la t io n  with Afghanistan was i t s  lack of in te res t. Factors 
con tr ibu ting  to American non-interest were Afghanistan’ s "under­
developed in fra s tru c tu re " , and i t s  rugged te rra in .  These features 
decreased i t s  economic potential and i t s  s tra teg ic  value. Furthermore, 
"Afghanistan had poor re lations with neighboring Iran and Pakistan, and 
the United States was re luctant to become involved in these parochial 
r i v a l r ie s . "37 Afghanistan had lim ited  business opportunity due to  i t s  
p r im it ive  conditions; and f in a l ly ,  they lacked adequate safety measures 
fo r  Americans due to i t s  unstable government.38
Therefore, although diplomatic re lations were established between 
the two countries in 1934, no major economic re la tions existed u n t i l  
1936. Then the major economic re lations between the United States and 
Afghanistan was a short l ived o i l  concessions of the Inland Exploration
12
Company. The Afghan government granted the American consortium "an 
exclusive 25-year concession."39 The Inland Exploration Company 
operated from November 19, 1936, u n t i l  June 19, 1938. On June 19,
Inland Exploration Company formally discontinued having learned o f a 
newly discovered o i l  reservoir in Saudi Arabia.40
While American in te res t in Afghanistan remained minimal, Soviet 
in te re s t in Afghanistan also declined beginning in the mid-1920s. By 
then the new regime in the Soviet Union had become more stable, the 
an t i- revo lu tionary  elements were defeated, and S o v ie t-B rit ish  re la tions 
had improved. Indeed, the Soviet government had become so strong that 
i t  disseminated i t s  s o c ia l is t  doctrine to other peoples outside i t s  
boundaries. Afghanistan, being i t s  southern neighbor was not l e f t  out; 
in the 1940s, the Soviets d is tr ibu ted  "pro-communist propaganda" among 
the Afghan people. But, in general un t i l  the la te  1950s the Americans 
and the Soviets, both, ignored Afghanistan.41
However, American neglect o f Afghanistan became more evident a fte r  
1953, when John Foster Dulles, Secretary o f State, formalized the 
'Northern T ie r ’ a lliance trea ty . This a lliance led to  American m il i ta ry  
pacts with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Although Afghanistan was situated 
between Iran and Pakistan, the trea ty  did not include her because the 
United States had no in te res t in the nation.42
In 1955, Secretary Dulles established the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO) as an anti-Soviet a lliance. Again i t  included 
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan; but not Afghanistan. The Americans were not 
in terested in the la te r .43
13
In addition, the American view on Pashtunistan, the disputed 
te r r i t o r y  between Afghanistan and Pakistan, fu rthe r l im ited  the 
re la tionsh ip  between United States and Afghanistan. Prior to 1955, the 
United States had in d ire c t ly  supported the Afghan view on Pashtunistan. 
But la te r ,  the American press and publications referred to  Pashtunistan 
as: " . . . t h e  tr ibe s  are linked with Afghanistan ethnographically, 
c u l tu ra l ly ,  re l ig io u s ly  and l in g u is t ic a l ly ; "  and " . . . th e  Durand l in e  was 
without any s tra teg ic , geographic, and cu ltu ra l basis;" and " . . . t h e  
Afghans feel an ob ligation to the t r ib e s . " 44
Later, however,' the United States changed i t s  view on the 
Pashtunistan issue. In a SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) 
meeting, John Foster Dulles stated tha t the United States "would help 
Pakistan in her dispute with Afghanistan." American’ s popular press 
re ite ra ted  and emphasized the o f f ic ia l  view. The April 9, 1956, L ife  
magazine wrote that the U.S. would support the Pakistanis in th e ir  claim 
fo r  Pashtunistan.45 SEATO was founded in 1954, in order to provide 
assistance to member countries in case of foreign attack. The 
Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Austra lia , New Zealand, B r ita in  and the 
United States were members of th is  organization.46
The re la tions between the Afghan government and the U.S. 
government were fu rthe r affected by the U.S. refusal to cooperate in the 
Afghan modernization o f th e ir  m il i ta ry .  Mohammad Daoud, Afghan M inister 
o f War, wished to modernize the Afghan m il i ta ry ;  so the Afghan 
government requested m il i ta ry  assistance from the United States. The 
la te r  nation agreed to se ll arms to Afghanistan; and on March 12, 1951, 
Secretary o f State Dulles v is i te d  Kabul to discuss m il i ta ry  aid with
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Daoud. Seven months la te r ,  the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, George 
M e r r i l l ,  to ld  Prime M inister Shah Mahmoud tha t the arms sale would cost 
Afghanistan $25,000,000 and the U.S. wanted the payment in cash.47
Since Afghanistan had no access to the open sea, the arms had to 
be shipped through Pakistan. The U.S. indicated as they were not 
responsible fo r  making arrangements with the Pakistani government, thus 
the Afghans must arrange the matter with Pakistan. Other conditions 
attached to the arms sale were that Afghanistan had to drop i t s  claim 
fo r  Pashtunistan. These conditions were unreasonable and unacceptable 
to the Afghan government and the arms deal with the United States was 
therefore postponed.48
Then in 1953, Daoud became Prime M inister. He was s t i l l  
especia lly interested in bu ild ing and modernizing Afghan’ s m il i ta ry .  
Conditions in the army were deplorable. The army carried nineteenth 
century r i f le s  o f the Snyder and Lee Enfield type, had unreliab le 
ammunition, and untrained sold iers. The Afghan a i r  force consisted o f 
twelve "bi-planes" from World War I . 49 Between 1953-1955, Prime 
M in ister Daoud, a talented army general and former M inister o f Defense, 
unsuccessfully requested United States m il i ta ry  assistance. Apparently 
the United States was concerned that the Afghan government might use the 
arms against Pakistan.50 For example, in 1954, Daoud attempted to 
secure American assistance in modernizing o f the Afghan army. In 
October, 1954, the Afghan Foreign M inister Mohammad Naim, v is i te d  with 
Secretary of State Dulles in Washington to obtain m il i ta ry  aid from 
Washington. In December Dulles replied:
A fte r careful consideration, extending m il i ta ry  aid to
Afghanistan would create problems not o ffse t by the
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strength i t  would generate. Instead o f asking fo r 
arms, Afghanistan should s e t t le  the Pushtunistan 
dispute with Pakistan.51
Dulles sent a copy of the le t te r  to  Pakistan as well. Afghanistan 
would not have been so anxious about receiving m i l i ta ry  aid from the 
United States i f  Pakistan had received s im ila r treatment. But through 
the Baghdad Pact, and the Central Treaty Organization, the Pakistani 
government received a huge amount o f m i l i ta ry  aid from the United 
States, and Afghanistan received none.52 Although the Afghans fa i le d  
to  receive m il i ta ry  aid from the United States, they received 
$25,000,000 in arms from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary and East Germany. The U.S.S.R. also b u i l t  m i l i ta ry  a i r f ie ld s  in 
Mazar-i-Sharif, Shindand, and Begram.53 America’ s non-interest in 
Afghanistan encouraged the Warsaw pact countries to  meet the m i l i ta ry  
needs o f the Afghan government.
The American Embassy in Kabul was also responsible fo r  the lack o f 
U.S. in te res t in Afghanistan, and refused to cooperate with the Kabul 
government. I t  fa i le d  to  normalize the re lations between the two 
countries. The U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, Angus Ward, hated communism 
and believed tha t Daoud was a Communist. Ward had b i t t e r  memories o f 
communism from when he had been held a hostage of the Chinese communists 
when he was a Consul General in Mukden. Ward fa i le d  to report to
Washington the danger o f the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.  He
t r ie d  on several occasions to remove Daoud with the help o f CIA and the 
Pakistani government.54 Although Daoud was aware o f the American 
Embassy’ s p lo t  through his secret police, Washington did not have any 
knowledge o f  Ward’ s plans.55 Ward’ s a c t iv i t ie s  in Kabul gave r ise  to
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anti-American fee ling among Afghans.56
Ambassador Ward was a main contribu tor to  the ex is ting  poor 
re la tionsh ip  between the United States and Afghanistan. In addition, 
the American Embassy in Kabul did not have a s ingle American o f f ic ia l  in 
the Embassy with s u f f ic ie n t  background on Afghan diplomacy or who knew 
the language.57
However, Daoud’ s close re la tions with Moscow did not go unnoticed 
by the United States. Some American spec ia lis ts  believed tha t Daoud 
could not be trusted and labeled him as being pro-Moscow. The United 
States ambassador in Kabul who fa i le d  to remove Daoud described Daoud as 
"untrustworthy and rash.’’58
As the resu lt o f the hostile  re lations between the United States 
and Afghanistan, the Kabul government re lied  on Moscow not only to 
modernize i t s  m i l i ta ry  but also to bu ild  i t s  economy. The Soviets 
provided Afghanistan with economic, technical and m i l i ta ry  assistance 
and began tra in in g  the m il i ta ry .  Thus, the "Soviet Union became 
Afghanistan’ s largest trading partner, and i t s  largest supplier o f 
m i l i ta ry  and economic a id . "59 Although the United States also 
provided Afghanistan with some economic aid, i t  was a very small amount 
compared to tha t from the Soviet Union or compared to  the U.S. aid to 
Pakistan and Iran .60
In mid-1955, Ward was replaced by Sheldon T. M il ls ,  and Armin 
Meyer was assigned as deputy ch ie f o f mission. Communication between 
the American Embassy and Afghan o f f ic ia ls ,  tha t was almost non-existent 
during Ward’ s ambassadorship, was re-established. The United States 
became involved in several projects in Afghanistan.61 However, these
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projects were small compared to  the U.S. projects in Iran and Pakistan. 
By 1956, Afghanistan received about s ix  m il l io n  do llars  in technical 
assistance, although Iran and Pakistan, each had received more than one 
hundred m il l io n  d o l la rs .62
Most o f United States’ aid was spent on education, i r r ig a t io n  and 
transporta tion . Much of the fund was devoted to  an i r r ig a t io n  pro ject 
in the Helmand Valley. In the f ie ld  of transporta tion the U. S. helped 
Ariana Afghan A ir l in e s , which served Afghan major c i t ie s ,  and flew 
in te rna tiona l f l ig h ts  to Delhi, Beirut, Mecca, Tehran, Prague, London 
and Frankfort. The United States also b u i l t  the Kandahar International 
A irp o r t .  In education, a large number of Afghan students studied in 
American un ive rs it ies . In addition, a number o f American ins tructors  
were sent to  teach in Afghan schools and Kabul U n ive rs ity .63 The 
Americans were aware that th e ir  assistance to the Afghan government was 
very small compared to the Soviet Union.
In November, 1956, N ik ita  Khrushchev v is i te d  Kabul. He met with 
King Zahir and Prime Minister Daoud, and announced tha t his government 
would provide a hundred m il l io n  do lla r  loan to Afghanistan, an Ilyushin 
airp lane and f i f t y  public transportation buses. With the help o f  the 
Soviet loan the Afghan government started a five-year plan in the areas 
of transporta tion , communication, industry, social services and mining. 
Although the plan did not meet i t  goals, s ig n if ica n t achievements were 
made.
The Soviet projects, compared with the American projects were:
completed speedily and placed only a modest burden on 
the Afghan economy, the American projects dragged on 
interminably and were more costly , with a high 
proportion o f expenditures going for American salaries
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and expensive housing.. ,64 
Unfortunately, the remainder o f the Ward era led Afghans to  believe tha t 
American assistance meant f igh t ing  the Cold War on th e ir  s o i l . 65 In 
1957, Washington began to  take seriously the degree o f Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan. They sent Henry Byroade as th e ir  new 
ambassador to  Kabul, to  reduce Soviet influence and involve Americans in 
more Afghan pro jects. At th is  la te  date even the U.S. projects were 
la te  and in s u f f ic ie n t  compared to  those o f the Soviets.66
In fac t,  the United States did not succeed in competing with the 
Soviets in Afghanistan during Daoud's presidency, 1953-1963. U.S.-
Afghan re la tions improved only a fte r  Daoud lo s t power. Afghanistan 
adopted a new cons titu t ion  in 1964. I t  changed the government from an 
o ligarchy to a constitu tiona l monarchy. According to  the new 
con s t itu t io n , immediate members of the royal family could not serve as 
prime m in is ter. Daoud, being f i r s t  cousin to King Zahir, 
was forced out o f power. Daoud had no authority  o f any kind during the 
cons t itu t iona l era.
The United States had an opportunity to bu ild  constructive and 
pos it ive  re la tions between the two countries a f te r  Daoud was removed 
from power. However, re la tions between the two countries did not 
improve as compared to the U.S.-Iran re lations and U.S.-Pakistan 
re la t ions . During the constitu tiona l period, 1963-1973, only one Afghan 
prime m in ister was inv ited  to Washington, because e a r l ie r  he had been 
ambassador in Washington. The American ambassador in Kabul was also 
unable to convince Washington to increase i t s  p o l i t ic a l  and economic 
support fo r  the Kabul government.67
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The Soviets, on the other hand, took advantage o f the s itua t ion . 
The new cons titu t ion  which authorized the formation o f p o l i t ic a l  
part ies , resulted in the establishment o f Khalq, a pro-Moscow communist 
party in 1965, with the support o f the Soviet Union. At the same time 
the Soviets seemed to consider the removal o f Daoud from power as a 
perfect opportunity fo r  them. They approached Daoud, apparently 
encouraged him to seize power, which he did and proclaimed a republic in 
Afghanistan in July 1973.68
On July 17, 1973, Mohammad Daoud came to  power as president in a 
bloodless coup d 'e ta t.  The coup came as a surprise to the Afghans; 
government employees witnessed some disturbances on th e ir  way to work 
but were unaware o f i t s  cause. Afghan radio broadcast at 7:20 a.m. on 
July 17th, tha t a republic had been established in Afghanistan, and tha t 
the government o f King Mohammad Zahir had been replaced by Mohammad 
Daoud.
The coup was carried out by jun io r o ff ice rs  o f the Afghan armed 
forces, mostly tra ined in the Soviet Union. President Daoud in his 
f i r s t  public speech, on Radio Afghanistan acknowledged the important 
ro le  played by the Afghan army o ff ice rs  in making the coup a success.
At the close o f his speech Daoud said: "I once again congratulate a l l  my 
countrymen on th is  great national achievement, and express my sincere 
thanks and gra titude to a l l  pa tr io ts  especially the Afghan armed forces 
who did not re fra in  from any sincere and se lfless e f f o r t s " . 69 Daoud's 
coup marked the end o f monarchy and establishment o f a republican 
government in Afghanistan.
Most Afghans welcomed the change and the establishment o f a new
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republic and considered the coup as the opening of a new era in the 
h is to ry  o f Afghanistan. Although the form of the government changed 
from monarchy to republic, the power remained in the same family.
Daoud’ s regime was supported by the members o f the pro-Soviel l e f t i s t  
Parcham party. The members o f Parcham partic ipated in important 
governmental decisions.
The Soviet Union was the f i r s t  nation to recognize the new Afghan 
republic. On July 19, Alexander Puzanov, the U.S.S.R. ambassador in 
Kabul, extended his government’ s recognition of Daoud’ s regime. A year 
la te r ,  in early June 1974, President Daoud v is ite d  the Soviet Union and 
discussed twenty-one Soviet-assisted projects in various f ie ld s .70
President Daoud’ s re lations with the Soviet Union during the 
decade o f his prime m in istry from 1953-1963, and his successful coup 
supported by the Parcham party members, made the West to  believe tha t he 
was pro-Moscow. President Daoud acknowledged the Parchamis support o f 
his republic and appointed some Parchamis to high government o ff ice s . 
This action was even more reason fo r western jo u rn a lis ts  to believe tha t 
he was pro-communist.71 Moscow countered the propaganda spread by the 
western media. On July 24, 1973, Moscow radio denounced the 
" im p e r ia l is t  propaganda" and said th a t  the change in the Afghan 
government was the resu lt o f the Afghan desire fo r  the advancement o f 
the country.72
Although Daoud was supported in his coup d ’ e ta t by the pro-Moscow 
Parcham party, and had assigned Parchamis to  some high positions, he was 
neither a communist nor wished to depend on Soviets fo r  a l l  his needs.
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He wished to  improve his re lations with the United States, and some 
other nations as well. In addition, Daoud desired to  maintain f r ie n d ly  
re la tions with Afghanistan’ s neighbors, Pakistan, Iran and the Soviet 
Union. He therefore began to l im i t  the power o f the le f t i s t  elements in 
his government. In sp ite  of the Parchmis’ f u l l  support o f Daoud’ s 
regime they were relieved from important government p o s it io ns .73
Regarding President Daoud’ s re lations with Pakistan, the 
Pashtunistan issue was the main obstacle to improving diplomatic 
re la tions with Pakistan. I t  had created tension between the two 
countries since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The Afghans supported 
the r ig h t  o f the Pashtuns to s e l f  determination.74 The Pashtunistan 
issue had hampered the Afghan economy because Afghanistan had no access 
to  open sea. Most imported merchandise entered Afghanistan through the 
sea port o f Karachi.
In addition to  Pakistan, Daoud wished to have closer re la tions 
with Iran, the United States, and other nations because he wished to 
reduce Soviet influence in Afghanistan. In the spring o f 1978,
President Daoud "v is ite d  India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia, c le a r ly  preparing 
the way fo r  closer alignment with these countr ies ."75 Daoud also sent 
a larger number o f Afghans fo r m il i ta ry  tra in ing  to  India, Egypt and the 
United States in order to l im i t  the influence of the Soviet-tra ined 
Afghans in the army and to  reduce Afghan dependency on the Soviet 
Union.76
In January, 1977, President Daoud and his brother Mohammad Naim, 
met w ith Leonid I l ic h  Brezhnev in Moscow. Brezhnev, aware o f President 
Daoud’ s decision tha t he would
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fo llow  a more balanced po licy and would reduce the Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan, asked Daoud to "get r id  of a l l  those im p e r ia l is t  advisors 
in your country .” President Daoud responded that there was a need fo r  
those advisors, i f  there was no need fo r them they would have l e f t . 77 
President Daoud.’s change o f po licy alarmed Moscow and the U.S.S.R. 
realized tha t " . . .  Daoud’ s continuation in o f f ic e  was no longer in the 
Soviet in te re s t . "78 In 1977, the Soviets convinced the Parcham and 
Khalq communist parties o f Afghanistan to unite against Daoud, and a 
coup was planned to  overthrow Daoud’ s government in August 1978.
Continuing his "policy o f l im it in g  communist a c t iv i t ie s  in  1977, 
Daoud introduced a new constitu t ion . He appointed a cabinet consisting 
of his close friends and the members of his family whom he could t ru s t .  
The new cons titu t ion  legalized a one party system, the National 
Revolutionary Party. President Daoud himself selected the members of 
i t s  central committee.79
Daoud however, was unaware o f the Soviet p lo t against his 
government and continued to  pursue improved re la tions with the United 
States. On October 1, 1977, he sent the Afghan Foreign M in ister Waheed 
Abdullah to meet with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Assistant 
Secretary o f State fo r  Near-Eastern and South Asian A f fa irs ,  A lfred L. 
Atherton. In th is  meeting Abdullah mentioned that his government 
desired to  establish closer re lations with the United States, and 
desired a "very v is ib le "  U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Vance responded 
by extending an in v i ta t io n  to  President Daoud to v i s i t  the United States 
in the summer o f 1978; Daoud accepted the in v i ta t io n .80
President Daoud decision to  reduce the influence o f the l e f t i s t
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elements in his government and to  ban i l le g a l  p o l i t ic a l  parties alarmed 
l e f t i s t  groups, as well as the Soviet Union. I t  energized Moscow and 
members o f the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to  remove 
Daoud from power.81
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The 1978 Coup d ’ e ta t in Afghanistan
An unknown assailant murdered M1r Akbar Khayber, a leading member 
o f Parcham Party, on April 17, 1978, in Kabul. During Khyber’ s funeral, 
Afghan communists, former members o f Parcham and Khalq parties ra l l ie d  
in an anti-government demonstration. In 1977, the two parties united 
and constitu ted the Peoples Democratic Party o f Afghanistan. They 
accused Daoud’ s regime of Khyber’ s assassination and t r ie d  to create 
anti-government fee ling among the people and to gather more support fo r 
th e ir  cause. They blamed the United States Central In te ll igence  Agency 
(CIA), in addition to President Daoud’ s secret police, fo r  Khyber’ s 
murder.1
Khyber’ s funeral gathered some ten to f i f te e n  thousand 
sympathizers who demonstrated in the streets of Kabul. Leaders o f the 
Peoples Democratic Party o f Afghanistan (PDPA) led a well organized 
anti-government demonstration during Khyber’ s funeral. This alerted 
President Daoud and the members of his cabinet to  the communist 
th re a t .2 For the f i r s t  time Daoud noticed a strong a l l iance  among the 
l e f t i s t  groups opposed to his regime. He therefore feared fu r the r a n t i - 
government a c t iv i t ie s  by the communists and ordered the arrest o f 
leading members o f the PDPA party.
On April 26, many PDPA party leaders were arrested, except fo r  
Hafizu llah Amin, a prominent PDPA leader. Amin was held under house 
arrest fo r  10 hours fo r  no obvious reason. While Amin was under
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detention he was allowed to receive v is i to rs .  Since Amin had recru ited 
a large number o f m i l i ta ry  personnel fo r  the PDPA party p r io r  to  
Khyber’ s murder,3 he had enough time, while under house arrest, to  pass 
coup ins truc tions  to key personnel in  the army and a i r  force. Amin’ s 
coup ins truc tions  on April 27, 1978, were based on a coup o r ig in a l ly  
planned in August, 1978. A basic coup plan had previously been prepared 
by the Soviets and the PDPA leaders. Thus, i t  was easy fo r  Amin to 
fo llow  the ins tructions and to stage a coup in a very short time. 
Although Amin used the plan, he was unable to coordinate his actions 
with the Soviets due to his rapid actions.4 Therefore, Amin did not 
secure approval from Moscow fo r a l l  his a c t iv i t ie s .5
Amin authorized Colonel Mohammad Aslam Watanjar to  control the 
ground forces, and Abdul Qadir, an a i r  force o f f ic e r ,  to command the 
Afghan a i r  fo rces .6 On the morning o f April 27, 1978, the coup d ’ e ta t 
began and the Afghan m il i ta ry  successfully carried out the coup.
A ir  force and the ground troops attacked the Presidential palace. 
Daoud refused to surrender and continued to f ig h t  u n t i l  he and some of 
his fam ily members and supporters were k i l le d .  Although f ig h t in g  
continued at m i l i ta ry  bases between communists and units loyal to  Daoud, 
the communists were able to  seize control o f important government 
o ff ices  and announce th e ir  v ic to ry .
The members o f the former Parcham party were aware tha t the 
country was not ready fo r a s o c ia l is t  regime and a premature s o c ia l is t  
coup would have undesirable consequences. They did not know tha t Amin 
had sent ins truc tions  fo r  staging a coup. They "were caught by surprise 
by the tim ing, but not the Soviets, whose sources kept them abreast o f
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developments at the time, though they made no move to warn president 
Daoud. "7
Most Afghans were also surprised on the morning o f A p ri l 27, and 
had no knowledge as to  who was f ig h t in g  whom. Late in the afternoon 
Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, an army o f f ic e r ,  announced on the radio tha t 
the power of the government had been transferred to the Revolutionary 
Council and Daoud’ s regime had ended. A fu rthe r announcement stated 
tha t: "The power of the family has been put to  an end. Now, fo r  the 
f i r s t  time, power has come in to  the hands of the people."8
The coup was bloody and sporadic f igh t ing  continued in various 
parts of the country and at m i l i ta ry  bases. The new leaders, however, 
were able to  hold on to power, to  establish a s o c ia l is t  regime and to  
force a new government in Afghanistan. On April 30, Radio Kabul 
introduced the members of the new government. Noor Mohammad Taraki 
became head o f the Revolutionary Council and Prime M in ister, Babrak 
Karmal became Vice-President o f the Revolutionary Council and Vice- 
Premier, and Hafizullah Amin became Vice-Premier and M in ister o f Foreign 
A ffa i r s .9
The members o f  Khalq and Parcham parties had a leadership ro le  in 
the Afghan government: they were united in 1977 and formed the Peoples’ 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Their un ity  was short l ived  as 
a re su lt  o f continuous c o n f l ic t  between the PDPA members over the 
leadership. The temporary unity between members o f Parcham and Khalq 
was tu rbu len t, since members o f each faction wanted to  have the upper 
hand in  the government. Each party, in turn, removed the members o f the 
opposite fac tion  from high government positions when they had the
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opportunity to do so.
Although the ultimate goal o f both factions was to  implement 
socialism in Afghanistan, they d iffe red  in th e ir  strateg ies of how to 
create an Afghan s o c ia l is t  society. Party in te rests  kept the new 
government divided and weak. I t  did not take long fo r  Taraki and Amin, 
who belonged to  the Khalq party, to  remove Parchamis and some non-party 
members from high government positions. Between July 1st and July 15th, 
nine prominent Parcham party members were sent in to  ex i le . Among them 
was Karmal who was the leader o f the Parcham party. Karmal was sent to  
Prague on July 5th, as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Amin was then 
elected Secretary General o f the PDPA Central Committee.10 To fu rthe r 
reduce the influence o f Parcham in the government, in August of 1978, 
M in ister of Defense Abdul Qader, M in ister of Planning Sultan A li 
Keshtmand and M inister o f Public Works Mohammad Rafi , a l l  members of the 
Parcham party, were accused of planning to overthrow Tarak i’ s government 
and were arrested.11
In addition to  a struggle fo r  leadership among the party members, 
the newly established Afghan government was unable to  gain the t ru s t  of 
the people and had to convince the Afghans that the leaders would work 
fo r  th e ir  in te res t.  Most Afghans, at the very early stage o f the coup, 
were unable to  predict the consequences of the events and did not 
express th e ir  strong opposition to the new regime. They waited to see 
how events would turn out. Opposition however to  the new regime 
gradually increased. There were several reasons fo r  the peoples' lack 
o f opposition to  the new regime; the follow ing are some o f the reasons:
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F irs t ,  many people wanted a change in the government; the 
previous government had fa i le d  to  meet the needs o f the Afghan 
c it iz e n ry .  The educated class in Afghanistan was frus tra ted  with the 
government bureaucracy and many found themselves unable to secure 
su itab le  jobs unless they had some connections with the ru l in g  fam ily or 
had personal friends in high government o f f ic ia l  c irc le s .  Also, the 
coup ended the almost h a lf  century o f one family ru le which had ruled 
Afghanistan since 1929. Afghans were sa t is f ie d , i f  not happy, to  see a 
change in the leadership.
Second, the newly appointed president, Noor Mohammad Taraki, was 
o f Pushtun o r ig in .  Some 56% o f Afghans were Pushtuns. Pushtuns had 
ruled the country fo r  centuries and the appointment o f a Pushtun as 
th e ir  leader was acceptable to most.
Third, Prime M in ister Taraki was a middle class Afghan 
in te l le c tu a l .  The majority of Afghans f e l t  comfortable with him and 
thought tha t he would understand th e ir  problems and would rea lize  th e ir  
needs be tte r.
Fourth, although Taraki was a s o c ia l is t ,  he did not openly admit 
i t  and did not id e n t i fy  his government as a s o c ia l is t  regime during his 
presidency. Afghans did not show strong opposition as long as he 
respected th e ir  idealogies and be lie fs .
F i f th ,  the central government in Afghanistan did not have any role 
in Afghan t r ib a l  areas, where a t r ib a l  leader implemented his own rules, 
and se tt led  disputes in his own way without re fe rr ing  the matter to  the 
central government. The change in government therefore did not a ffec t 
the t r ib a l  s tructure  o f Afghan society since the central government did
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not have any ro le  or power to exercise in t r ib a l  areas.
Thus, the PDPA did not face strong opposition from the people at 
the beginning o f the regime, except fo r  the f ig h t in g  which had continued 
at m i l i ta ry  bases between the supporters o f the old and the new regimes. 
However, opposition to  the government did increase a f te r  the new 
government became known as a M arxist-Lenin ist regime.
Furthermore, the government fa i le d  to  broaden i t s  base and did not 
include other elements o f the society in i t s  operational organization. 
Also, the government introduced a series o f hasty reforms instead of 
introducing gradual change over a longer period o f time. The decrees 
tha t the government implemented were in c o n f l ic t  with the Afghan 
t ra d it io n a l practice. The Afghans reacted angri ly  to  the Marriage Law 
and also did not support the Agrarian Reform. Decrees No. 6 and No. 8 
introducing agrarian reform abolished feudalism in Afghanistan. In 
introducing Decree No. 7 the government wished to impose a re s t r ic t io n  
on marriage expenses and to prevent ch i ld  marriage which was practice in 
the country. I t  set a minimum age fo r  marriage fo r  g i r ls  at sixteen and 
fo r  boys at eighteen.12 The fa i le d  reforms resulted in  more opposition 
and bloodshed in the country.
The coup d ’ e ta t in Afghanistan was not only a surprise to  Afghans 
but was also a surprise to  United States o f f i c ia l s . 13 Washington 
claimed tha t they were not aware o f a possible Afghan, coup and had no 
advance knowledge tha t President Daoud’ s government was in danger. 
According to  some reports, however, Washington was informed of a 
possible coup in Afghanistan but did not consider the th rea t to  Daoud’ s 
regime to  be a serious one. In fac t,  Washington ignored Pakistan's and
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I ra n ’ s reports regarding Daoud’ s weak position and the th reat to  his 
government.
Six months before the coup, the Shah o f Iran reported tha t "Daoud
was getting old and d isturb ing elements were at play in the
country. . . 1,14 According to another report published in the Washington
Post. Pakistan warned the Carter administration about the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f
a s o c ia l is t  coup in Afghanistan. The warnings were ignored by the
Carter adm in is tra tion .15 Subsequently, the United States repeatedly
denied receiving such warnings.16
A fte r the successful coup, the Democratic Republic o f  Afghanistan
(DRA) was established. The United States government was uncertain as to
the ideology o f the Afghan regime, and did not know whether to  label the
DRA regime as a communist or a neutral government. Though the DRA was
pro-Soviet and followed a s o c ia l is t  pattern in i t s  adm in istrative
a f fa i r s ,  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the United States to name the Afghan
regime communist since the Afghan leaders did not admit i t .  The Carter
administration therefore decided to maintain f r ie n d ly  re la tions with
Afghanistan fo r as long as Afghanistan followed a non-alignment po licy
as before.17 Theodore E l io t ,  the U.S. ambassador in Kabul from 1973
to  1979, in a telegram to Washington on May 11, 1978, wrote tha t:
We have not yet been able to determine whether or not _ 
the new Afghan government indeed q u a lif ie s  as a 
Communist regime in the context o f Section 629 (F) o f 
the Foreign Assistant A c t.18
E lio t  suggested tha t the United States should not commit i t s e l f  to new 
aid ob ligations in Afghanistan.19
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Thus, the United States followed a wait and see po licy  the f i r s t  
few months. On the one hand, the Soviets were involved in the da ily  
a f fa i rs o f the Afghan
government. On the other hand, the Afghan government o f f ic ia ls  
indicated on various occasions tha t they would welcome any economic 
assistance from the U.S. government. Noor Mohammad Taraki, president 
and prime m inister o f the new Afghan regime, in his f i r s t  news 
conference on May 13, 1978, said tha t his government hoped fo r  economic 
assistance from the United States.20
The U.S. government did not commit i t s e l f  to  new economic projects 
in Afghanistan; in fac t, i t  reduced i t s  ex isting aid programs. However, 
the United States decided to  maintain i t s  presence in Afghanistan and 
met w ith Afghan government o f f i c ia ls . 21 Thus, in i t s  March 28, 1979 
meeting the U.S. Foreign A ffa irs  Committee suggested fu r the r cuts in 
U.S. aid p ro je c ts .22
Afghanistan was not o f v i ta l  in te res t to the United States even 
before the s o c ia l is t  regime in Afghanistan. The U.S.A. had maintained 
close re la tions with Iran and Pakistan. However, in 1978, the s itua t ion  
in  Iran had also changed; the Islamic revolutionaries had gathered 
enormous support and had turned almost everyone in the country against 
the Shah. The Shah was forced to leave Iran on January 16, 1979.23 
Iran was the closest U.S. a l ly  in the area and was m i l i t a r i l y  strong.
"By 1975, Iran was the fourth most powerful m i l i ta ry  machine in the 
world - a f te r  the United States, the USSR, and Is ra e l . "24 The United 
States knew tha t the American position in the area had weakened a fte r  
the f a l l  o f the Shah. The re la tionsh ip between Iran and the U.S. became
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ho s t i le  a f te r  Ayatullah Khomaini took power in Iran. On February 14, 
1979, the US embassy in Tehran was surrounded by Iranian students who 
shouted anti-American slogans. The U.S. ambassador in Tehran, William 
Su llivan, and some seventy members of the embassy s ta f f  were trapped in 
the embassy fo r about ninety minutes while gun shots were f i re d  outside 
the embassy compound.25
U.S. re la tions with Pakistan were tense as well. The Pakistani 
government was engaged in constructing a nuclear enrichment f a c i l i t y .
In 1976, France wanted to supply Pakistan with a nuclear reprocessing 
p lant, but as a resu lt o f strong U.S. objection, the French government 
withdrew from the agreement. In April 1979, the United States 
government under the provision o f the Foreign Assistance Act, prohib ited 
supplying new economic and m il i ta ry  assistance to  those countries 
acquiring material or technology to bu ild  nuclear f a c i l i t i e s . 26 Thus, 
the United States had not only lo s t the support o f the Shah o f Iran, but 
i t s  re la t ions  with Pakistan were also going badly. The success o f the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan convinced the U.S. po licy  makers tha t the 
Soviet Union was gaining influence in the area and was on the verge o f 
achieving i t s  centuries-old desire o f con tro ll ing  the Persian Gulf. 
President Carte r’ s po licy was to defend the Gulf states from foreign 
attack. He increased the U.S. m i l i ta ry  presence in the region by 
signing agreements with Oman, Egypt, Somalia and Kenya.27
The United States had t ra d i t io n a l ly  considered Afghanistan as 
being w ith in  the Soviet sphere of influence and therefore, did not 
include Afghanistan in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), South 
East Asian Treaty (SEATO) and the Northern Tier A lliance Treaty.
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However, the U.S. did not ignore the changes in government in 
Afghanistan a fte r  the s o c ia l is t  coup. Afghanistan was considered a 
bu ffe r zone and was not strong m i l i t a r i l y .  When Daoud requested 
m i l i ta ry  assistance, the U.S. government declined. Daoud’ s m i l i ta ry  
needs were then met by the Soviet Union.28 Secretary o f State Cyrus 
Vance wrote in his memoirs tha t: "The United States had few resources in 
the area and h is to r ic a l ly  we had held the view that our v i ta l  in te res ts  
were not involved th e re ."29
In 1978, the United States government replaced Theodore E l l io t ,  
the U.S. ambassador fn Kabul, with Adolph Dubs, Soviet s p e c ia l is t  and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State fo r  Near Eastern and South Asian 
A f fa i r s .30 Dubs knew tha t Afghanistan was important fo r  regional 
s t a b i l i t y . 31 He wished to  analyze the Afghan s itua t ion  in the context 
o f Soviet re la t ions , and advise the U.S. government accordingly.
However, the unfortunate kidnapping o f Dubs ending in his assassination 
on April 14, 1979, worsened the re la tionsh ip between the DRA and the 
U.S. government. Dubs’ assassination by suspected "anti-Afghan 
government elements", combined with the Foreign A ffa irs  Committee’ s 
decision to reduce aid programs in Afghanistan, led to a major cutback 
in the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the termination o f U.S. aid 
programs in tha t country.32_ The Voice of America subsequently 
announced tha t $17 m il l io n  in American assistance to  Afghanistan had 
been cu r ta ile d  due to  Ambassador Dubs’ murder.33
While the Americans were cu tt ing  th e ir  aid programs in 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was increasing i ts  economic aid. U.S. 
economic aid in Afghanistan in 1979 amounted to $10.6 m il l io n ;  in 1980
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i t  ended. During the same period, the Soviets increased the amount of 
th e ir  economic assistance to Afghanistan. Soviet economic assistance in 
1980 amounted to  $705 m il l io n ;  in 1981, $25 m il l io n ,  1982 $90 m il l io n ,  
1983, $370 m il l io n ,  and in 1984 $325 m i l l io n .34 The U.S. government 
estimated tha t the Soviet Union’ s cost o f occupation in the f i r s t  four 
years was $12 b i l l i o n ;  and in 1984 i t  was estimated at $4 b i l l i o n . 35
The decision to cut back American aid programs was also 
recommended to U.S. government o f f ic ia ls  by other countries including 
Great B r i ta in ,  Germany, Canada and India. However, they did suggest 
tha t the United States should maintain i t s  presence in Afghanistan.36 
A fte r Dubs’ murder the Americans l iv in g  in Afghanistan were concerned 
about th e ir  own safety. Non-essential American personnel and a l l  Peace 
Corp volunteer workers l e f t  Afghanistan in early 1979. Occasional 
safety ins truc tions  were issued by the U.S. Embassy to  the remaining 
American personnel s t i l l  l iv in g  in Afghanistan.37
V a s il iy  Safronchuk, Soviet ambassador in Kabul, assured Bruce 
Amstutz, American Charge’ d ’A ffa ires , of the safety o f the American 
personnel in Afghanistan. Safronchuk stated tha t the Afghan government 
had the s itu a t io n  very much under control and he saw no reason fo r  the 
Americans to evacuate.38
The safety assurance to the Americans in Kabul did not come only 
from Soviet sources but from Afghan government au tho rit ies  as well. On 
July 24, 1979, Shah Mohammad Dost, F irs t  Deputy M in ister fo r  P o l i t ic a l 
A f fa irs ,  met with Amstutz, Charge d ’ a f fa ires , U.S. Embassy 1n Kabul, and 
Bruce A. F la t in  in the Kabul Foreign M in istry bu ild ing. Dost expressed 
his concerns about the evacuation of United States personnel from
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Afghanistan, and assured Amstutz tha t the Americans would be safe in 
Afghanistan.39 On July 25, the Soviet ambassador Alexander M. Puzanov 
met with Amstutz. Puzanov brought up U.S. concerns about "potentia l 
harm" to the Americans in Kabul.40 Not withstanding these assurances, 
i t  seemed tha t the United States government was determined to reduce i t s  
s ta f f  members in Afghanistan and the safety assurances to  the Americans 
by DRA and the Soviet o f f ic ia ls  did not change th e ir  dec is ion.41 Other 
countries in the area thought tha t the U.S. should maintain i t s  presence 
in Afghanistan so tha t in the event o f any p o l i t ic a l  developments in the 
country, the United States would be capable o f responding in t im e.42 
The evacuation o f the American personnel from Afghanistan was also 
accompanied by an enormous amount of p u b l ic i ty  in the American media.
In fa c t,  the Afghan government was more concerned about U.S. p u b l ic i ty  
regarding the evacuation than the evacuation i t s e l f .  The p u b l ic i ty  not 
only damaged the Afghan government’ s prestige as fa r  as being able to 
provide safety fo r  i t s  foreign residents, but i t  also encouraged other 
countries to fo llow  the American lead. Dost pointed out his 
government’ s concerns to  Amstutz and F la t in  during th e ir  July 24th, 
meeting, and said tha t: " th is  plan could have been worked out in a calm 
and quiet form without being pub lic ized ."43 On August 7, 1979, more 
than one hundred U.S. c it izens were evacuated from Afghanistan.44
Other western countries followed the American leadership. For 
example, on August 7, 1979, the North A t la n t ic  Treaty Organization 
(NATO) P o l i t ic a l  Committee discussed the Afghan s itu a t io n . The Canadian 
representative at the meeting mentioned his government’ s desire to 
evacuate i t s  personnel from Afghanistan.45 The evacuation o f the
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western countries from Afghanistan not only made the Afghan government 
weak, but i t  also le f t  no other options fo r  the DRA but to  depend on the 
Soviet government and other Eastern European countries fo r  assistance in 
handling the growing economic and p o l i t ic a l  problems in Afghanistan.
In sp ite  o f the United States’ decision to evacuate, the Afghan 
government t r ie d  to  improve i t s  re la tions with the United States. U.S. 
government o f f ic ia ls ,  while assuring Afghan leaders tha t th e ir  
government had a desire to  improve re la tions with them, at the same time 
were engaged in anti-Afghan government a c t iv i t ie s  by supporting the 
anti-government groups. Amstutz wrote about his meeting with Dost to  
the State Department, saying tha t he responded to Dost’ s desire fo r  
improved re la t ions  with: "the USG (U.S. government) also wants f r ie n d ly  
re la t ions  with the DRA, . . .  and, once again, denied tha t we were engaged 
in any subversive anti-Khalq e f fo r t s . " 46 When Amstutz wrote to 
Washington tha t he "denied" being involved in anti-DRA a c t iv i t ie s ,  i t ,  
o f course, could have meant that he knew the fac t but he denied i t .  The 
U.S. also denied tha t i t  was providing m il i ta ry  assistance to the rebels 
in 1979. Americans did not want the Soviets to ju s t i f y  th e ir  action in 
f ig h t in g  the Americans in Afghanistan.47
American o f f ic ia ls  denied providing assistance to  the DRA 
opposition and said that i f  the Afghan government had evidence o f i t  
they "would l ik e  to  know about i t . " 48 On July 5, 1979, during a 
meeting with Amstutz, Puzanov indicated tha t the government o f 
Afghanistan had "documented evidence" o f foreign interferences in the 
Afghan a f f a i r s .49 The Carter administration claimed tha t the United 
States did not favor the anti-Afghan groups who were u n like ly  to  unite
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and had conservative views.50 However, U.S. knowledge o f the rebe ls ’ 
views did not stop the CIA from covert operations and from providing 
extensive m i l i ta ry  assistance to  the rebels in th e ir  f ig h t  against the 
Kabul government.
The U.S. government did not wish to  improve i t s  re la tions with 
Afghanistan as long as a s o c ia l is t  government remained in power', and Ihe 
Soviets had the upper hand in Afghan a f fa irs .  Although the DRA sent 
several messages requesting closer t ie s  with the United States through 
various channels, the U.S. government fa i le d  to  take advantage o f the 
s itu a t io n  and to  consider the Afghan request more seriously. Puzanov 
also indicated the DRA’ s desire fo r improving re la tions with the U.S. 
government. Puzanov added tha t i t  was obvious from the DRA’ s 
recognition o f the 4th o f July, the American independence day, tha t the 
DRA wanted to  have close re lations with the United States.51 Several 
high ranking Afghan o f f ic ia ls  attended the 4th of July reception in 
Kabul. The Kabul Times, a da ily  English language newspaper, in i t s  July 
4th issue published on i t s  fron t page, president Carter’ s photograph and 
a congratulatory message from the Afghan government to  the Americans, on 
th e ir  independence day. A f r ien d ly  e d ito r ia l a r t ic le  also appeared in 
the same issue.52
On August 6, Amstutz met with Shah Wali, the newly appointed 
Deputy Prime M in ister and Foreign Minister. Amstutz handed over to Wali 
a le t t e r  from the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, congratulating him 
on his new appointment. During th is  meeting Wali indicated tha t the DRA 
desired to  maintain good re lations between the two countries. At the 
same time he also c r i t ic iz e d  the American press fo r  i t s  negative
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a tt i tu d e  toward the DRA.53 Louis Dupree, U.S. h is to r ian  and Afghan
s p e c ia l is t ,  said tha t:
. . .  one may deplore the bloodshed which accompanied 
the revolution and feel remorse fo r the dead, but an 
enlightened press should avoid the loose use o f the 
term ’ communist.’ A ll should examine the words o f the 
new leaders ca re fu l ly ,  fo r government, l ik e  persons, 
should be considered innocent u n t i l  proven g u i l t y . 54
Later Shah Wali, in an in terview with the United News of India, 
emphasized tha t: "Afghanistan wanted good p o l i t ic a l  re la t ions  with the 
US, but Washington seems to be unw illing  to ass is t us." The Afghan 
government o f f ic ia ls "  repeated desire fo r  be tte r re la t ions  could have 
been an ind ica to r of Afghan desire fo r  good re la tions with a l l  
countries: to keep the non-alignment status o f Afghanistan a l ive : and to 
reduce the DRA’ s dependency on the Soviet Union. W ali’ s desire fo r 
"good p o l i t ic a l  re la tions" could also be an ind ica tion  of DRA’ s tense 
re la t ions  with the Soviet Union. The use o f the word "ass is t"  by Wali 
might ind icate the seriousness of DRA’ s troubles with Moscow.55 I t  was 
c lear from circumstance tha t Amin was unhappy with the developments in 
Afghanistan and he was ready to accept the consequences o f his 
ac t ions .56
Amin, in another in terview on September 6, said tha t Afghanistan 
was looking forward to establishing f r ie n d ly  re la tions w ith the U.S.
The U.S. considered the Afghan government’ s desire to establish be tte r 
re la tions a " f a i r l y  standard" announcement.57 Prime M in ister Amin in 
his in terv iew with foreign jo u rn a lis ts  on September1 6, again expressed 
his government’ s desire fo r  improving re la tions w ith the United States. 
Amin said: "We want to have fr ie n d ly  re la tions w ith China and the United
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S ta tes ."58
As shown above, the Afghan government made several attempts to 
improve th e ir  re la tions with the United States. The US government 
o f f ic ia ls  understood the Afghan desire, but they viewed the Afghan 
actions as "unimportant gestures".59
The p o l i t ic a l  s itua tion  in Afghanistan changed again. On 
September 14, 1979, Prime M inister Amin removed Taraki from power and 
became President and Prime M inister. Beginning with Amin’ s presidency 
re la t ions  between Kabul and Moscow started to deteriorate. Foreign 
diplomats noticed th is  de terio ra tion . For example, i t  took f iv e  days 
fo r  Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Alexi Kosygin to send 
congratulatory telegrams to Amin.60 Normally, the Soviet Union 
responded immediately; the f iv e  days delay seemed unusual fo r  Moscow.
During his three months of ru le , Amin unsuccessfully and ove rt ly  
t r ie d  to improve re la tions with the United States. The murder of 
Ambassador Dubs, and the DRA's dependency on the Soviet Union were the 
major obstacles in the way o f improving re la tions between the two 
coun tr ies .61 While the U.S. government did not make any move to 
improve i t s  re la tions with the DRA, i t  did however, continue to  maintain 
contact w ith Afghan au tho rit ies . The United States blamed the Afghan 
government fo r  the poor state o f re la tions between the two countries. 
Jack C. Miklos, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau fo r  Near Eastern & 
South Asian A f fa irs ,  Department o f State, in a congressional b r ie f in g  
said: "The poor state o f our current re la tionsh ip  was not our choice . . .  
We would be happy to  see some concrete signs that the Afghan government 
share th is  d e s ire .1,62
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U.S.-Afghan re la tions did not improve. President Amin met w ith 
Amstutz on September 27. Amin knew tha t he was in deep trouble w ith the 
Soviet Union and wished to  improve re la tions with the U.S. and other 
countries in order to survive. The Soviets had always d is like d  the 
independent-minded Amin and had t r ie d  on several occasions in the past 
to  e lim inate him. However, th e ir  plans fa i led.63
President Amin stopped the Soviets from bu ild ing m i l i ta ry  bases in 
Afghanistan and reconstructing Afghan security  forces. A contract was 
signed between Moscow and Kabul before September 1979, to  bu ild  two 
m i l i ta ry  bases in Afghanistan. The CIA estimated a $200 m il l io n  
contract fo r  bu ild ing these two bases near Farah and Shindand. On 
September 18, 1979, Amin announced his in ten tion  to  reorganize the 
security  services thereby fru s tra t in g  the Russian plans.64
In th is  d ire c t confrontation with U.S.S.R. Amin needed the 
economic support o f the U.S. government fo r his su rv iva l. During the 
September 27th meeting with Amstutz, Amin emphasized improving re la tions 
between the two countries. Amstutz, upon ins truc tions  from the State 
Department, avoided giving any promises, did not discuss the U.S. 
embassy s ta f f  reduction, and kept the meeting as short as possib le .65
The U.S. wished to  hear from Amin tha t he would be reducing the 
Soviet influence in Afghan a f fa irs ,  and also desired an o f f i c ia l  apology 
from the Afghan government fo r Dubs’ murder. When Amin expressed his 
w illingness to  apologize fo r Dubs’ assassination, American o f f ic ia ls  
regarded i t  as a Soviet strategy fo r  " . . .  upgrading the image of Amin, 
as we (the U.S.) believe they might be advising him to  improve his 
re la t ions  with non-soc ia lis t coun tr ies .1,66 The U.S. however, fa i le d  to
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c la r i f y  the Soviets ’ motive fo r  enhancing Amin’ s e f fo r ts  fo r  improving 
his re la t ions  with the United States.
Considering the strained re lations between Amin and the Soviets i t  
was doubtful that the Soviets were w i l l in g  to  improve Amin’ s reputation. 
Because Amin would not allow Russian troops to enter Afghanistan, the 
U.S.S.R. could ju s t i f y  th e ir  involvement in Afghanistan as maintaining 
Afghan sovereignty by "freeing" that nation from American imperialism. 
Whatever the case might be, i t  seems un like ly  tha t the Russians would 
in s tru c t  Amin to improve his re lations with the United States. Amin’ s 
desire fo r  improved re la tions could only mean tha t Amin was t ry in g  to 
reduce his dependency on the Soviet Union. The tense re la t ions  between 
Amin and the Soviets would end only in the e lim ination of Amin, unless 
he had a strong backing from the U.S. government. Amin was aware o f the 
fac t tha t his days were numbered unless he received United States 
support. Amin expressed his feelings and said tha t he hoped to  be a l ive  
"to  see a s o c ia l is t  society in Afghanistan."67
Amin struggled to gain the t ru s t  and the support o f U.S. 
government o f f ic ia ls  fo r  his government. For example, Afghan M in ister 
o f Information and Culture, Khayal Mohammad Katawazi, sent th i r t y - fo u r  
o f his s ta f f  members fo r  English tra in ing  to  the classes provided by the 
American Embassy in Kabul. He also asked the U.S. fo r  "increased 
cooperation between Afghanistan and the United S ta tes ."68 During a 
September 27th meeting in New York, David Newsom, U.S. Under Secretary 
fo r  P o l i t ic a l  A f fa irs ,  U.S. Department of State, and Afghan M in ister of 
Foreign A f fa irs ,  Shah Wali expressed his government’ s desire fo r  better 
re la t ions  with the U.S. Newsom, in addition to mentioning Amin’ s
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cordia l conversation with Amstutz, said tha t the U.S. Congress had 
reacted strongly to  the assassination o f Ambassador Dubs, and: "we 
welcomed word tha t President Amin wants better re la tions. When the time 
comes tha t be tte r re la tions can be discussed, we w i l l  explore how the 
conditions la id  down by congress might be met."69
On the same day Asadullah Matin, D irector of the M in is try  o f 
Foreign A f fa irs ,  Information Div is ion, met with Marilyn Mcafee, 
Afghanistan Desk O ff ice r. Matin had also noted the Afghan government’ s 
request fo r  improved re la tions with the United States, and said tha t 
Amin was "personally"extremely interested in improvement o f re la tions 
w ith the US. Now was the time o f oppo rtun ity ."70 Amin was aware tha t 
the Soviets were determined to remove him from power and to  in s ta l l  a 
more obedient leader who would fo llow  th e ir  orders.
The United States was aware o f Amin’ s tense re la tions with the 
Soviet Union.71 Although the DRA and USSR were careful to  hide th e ir  
d ifferences pu b l ic ly ,  they did not remain hidden. Soviet in te res t and 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in Amin’ s government decreased. Puzanov, the U.S.S.R. 
ambassador in  Kabul did not pa rt ic ipa te  in Afghan government a c t iv i t ie s  
as he previously did. On October 2, Puzanov was not present at the 
inauguration o f the PDPA Training In s t i tu te  and did not attend Shah 
W ali’ s b r ie f in g  o f " f r ie n d ly  s o c ia l is t  ambassadors", which was held on 
October 6th. On October 10, Puzanov arrived la te  at "the ceremony 
in s t i tu t in g  the Constitutional Convention."72
The Kabul government wanted to  emphasize American involvement in 
Afghan a f fa i r s .  Probably government o f f ic ia ls  thought tha t i t  would 
convince the Americans o f Afghan desire fo r  improved re la t ions . On
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October 8, the Kabul Times published a news item about the purchase o f a
DC-10, and i t s  a r r iva l at the Kabul a irpo r t  a day e a r l ie r .  The news
mentioned tha t at the ceremony, Bareq Shafiee, m in is ter, Nazar Mohammad,
deputy m in ister o f Transport and Tourism, the United States Charge
d 'a f fa ire s  and other members o f the US embassy in Kabul were present.73
On October 1, Amstutz wrote the follow ing to  the State Department,
in which he mentioned tha t:
During the la s t seven days, we have been receiving 
clear signals tha t the DRA seeks better re la tions with 
US. I th ink i t  is  important tha t these be appreciated, 
but I also believe i t  is  too early to t e l l  whether 
these signs w i l l  be substantiated in areas important 
to  us.74
As a gesture of good w i l l ,  Amstutz mentioned tha t the Afghan 
government, in addition to  repeated requests fo r  be tte r re la tions 
between DRA and U.S. government, had recently sent a large contingent o f 
high ranking Afghan o f f ic ia ls  to attend the 4th o f July reception in 
Kabul. Amin also received Amstutz in his presidentia l palace in a very 
f r ie n d ly  atmosphere on September 27. Amin requested improved re la t ions  
between the two countries. In addition, M in ister of Information and 
Culture, Khyal Katawazi talked to  an ICA Washington v is i to r  on the 
phone; she was denied prev iously .75
How did the United States respond to  these overtures? The State 
Department instructed Archer K. Blood," Amstutz’ s replacement, to  
question the DRA’ s position on issues close to those o f Soviet Union and 
Cuba.76 The U.S. o f f ic ia l  should have realized tha t Amin was an Afghan 
n a t io n a l is t  with a M arxist-Len in ist ideology. His ideas on 
in te rna tiona l issues were not from the Soviet Union or Cuba but based on
49
his own ideology. His plea fo r  U.S. assistance did not mean tha t he had 
changed his ideas. He wished Afghanistan to be independent. Thus, 
Amin's opinion on national and in ternational issues was not d icta ted to  
him by the Soviet Union. In fac t,  Amin's position on many issues 
concerning his government were not what the Soviets desired. The reason 
tha t the Soviets wanted to remove him was because he resisted Soviet 
plans in  Afghanistan. In addition, Amin's brutal treatment o f his 
opposition had turned Afghans against the Soviets who supported the 
Marxist regime in Afghanistan. The Russians wanted to  gain the 
confidence of the Afghan people in order to  achieve th e ir  objectives and 
to  maintain a Soviet-contro lled s o c ia l is t  government in Afghanistan.
On October 27, 1979, Archer K. Blood, the U.S. Charge’ d ’ a ffa ires  
in Kabul, met w ith Amin. During th is  meeting Amin emphasized tha t he 
wanted to  improve re la t ions  with the United States and he added tha t 
Afghanistan was in "desperate need" of aid. Amin said tha t the United 
States was prepared to  give $10 m il l io n  to the Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan, but i t  was not assisting the Afghan government to solve the 
problem.77 Next day, the October 28, issue of the Kabul Times 
published a photograph o f Amin’ s meeting with Blood on the f i r s t  
page.78
Three days la te r ,  the U.S. ambassador in Pakistan, Arthur W. 
Hummel, met w ith Riaz Piracha, Foreign Secretary o f Pakistan, regarding 
the Afghan s itu a t io n . Hummel briefed Piracha on the October 27th 
meeting between Amin and Blood; Piracha was surprised tha t Amin 
personally met w ith Blood instead o f the Afghan Foreign m in is ter Shah 
Wal i .79
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Amin t r ie d  to  l im i t  the Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The 
Soviets desired to  bu ild  m i l i ta ry  bases in Afghanistan; Amin stopped 
th e ir  plan. In an interview with Adel Said Bishtawi, an Arab 
jo u rn a l is t ,  Amin on December 12, stated: "No Soviet m i l i ta ry  bases w i l l  
be b u i l t  in Afghanistan." During the same interv iew he also said tha t 
he was awaiting v is i t s  with Agha Shahi, Pakistan Foreign M in is ter, and 
Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan Prime Minister in an e f fo r t  to  improve re la t ions  
between the two countries .80 Amin also denied the Soviets ’ request to 
send.troops to  f ig h t  the Afghans opposing his government. Amin 
unsuccessfully t r ie d  to balance the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. In doing so 
he contributed to  his downfall. Thus, the Soviets, alarmed at his 
"independence," took action to ha lt Amin’ s "pro-western" in c l in a t io n s .
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CHAPTER THREE 
Hafizullah Amin
One o f the most active leaders of the Peoples Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan was Hafizu llah Amin. Amin was born in 1929, in Paghman 
Woleswali o f Kabul to  a Ghilzai Pashtun family. Amin lo s t his fa ther, 
Habibullah Amin, while he was s t i l l  a young boy. A fte r his fa th e r 's  
death, Amin’ s elder brother, Abdullah Amin, became his guardian. Amin 
completed his primary education in Paghman, and his secondary education 
in Darulmalimin o f Kabul. He enrolled at Kabul Univers ity , Faculty o f 
Science where he earned a Baccalaureate o f Science degree, majoring in 
mathematics and physics. A fte r  his graduation from Kabul Un ivers ity , he 
taught and la te r  became the v ice -p rinc ipa l at the In s t i tu te  o f Kabul 
Darulmalimin. A fte r a short period o f time he served as princ ipa l of 
Ibn-e-Sina high school in Kabul.1
In 1957, Amin earned a scholarship to  the United States to  work on 
his master’ s degree in education at the Teachers College Columbia 
Univers ity . He completed his studies in education administration and 
organization in the United States and returned to Afghanistan. In 
Afghanistan he joined the Faculty o f Education at the Kabul Un ivers ity . 
The Kabul M in is try  o f Education f i r s t  appointed Amin as Principal o f 
Ibn-e-Sina high school, la te r  as Principal o f Darulmalimin o f Kabul, 
before being transferred to  the newly established Teachers Training 
In s t i tu te  in Kabul ,2
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In 1962 Amin received another scholarship to  the United States to 
work on his Ph.D. at Columbia University. He attended a summer study 
camp at the Univers ity  o f  Wisconsin where he was elected the President 
o f the Afghan Students Association in the United States. Although his 
Ph. D. course work was almost completed and he was preparing himself fo r  
the oral defense, the United States au tho rit ies  asked him to  leave the 
country because o f his p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t i e s .3 His request to  be 
allowed to  complete his work, even at his own expense, was denied due to 
his p o l i t ic a ls .  Amin’ s p o l i t i c a l l y  active l i f e  in the United States 
ended in his expulsion from the United States in 1965.4
Although the real reasons fo r  Amin’ s expulsion from the United 
States were his p o l i t ic a l  views and his active involvement in communist 
c irc le s ,  the U.S. government o f f ic ia ls  to ld  Amin that the government o f 
Afghanistan has recalled him even i f  he has not completed his Ph.D. work 
at Columbia University. Amin le f t  the United States in 1965. A fte r  he 
arrived in Kabul, he learned tha t the United States government had 
deported him.5 Anthony Arnold, a spe c ia lis t  in Afghanistan studies and 
the author o f several books and a r t ic le s  on Afghanistan, believed that 
Amin’ s p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv i t ie s  l e f t  him with l i t t l e  time to  complete his 
s tud ies .6 According to Bruce Amstutz, Amin " fa i le d  his doctoral 
examinations at Columbia U n ive rs ity ."7
In the f a l l  o f 1965, Amin ran fo r  the 12th Wolesi Jirgah (National 
Assembly), a four year term, from Paghman Woluswali o f Kabul. He lo s t 
in  the e lection . Amin subsequently taught at the Rabia Balkhi high 
school fo r about a year. Then he served as a member o f the Primary 
Education Department o f the M in istry o f Education fo r another three
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years. Khalq was established in Kabul and held i t s  f i r s t  meeting on 
January 1, 1965, under the chairmanship of Noor Mohammad T arak i. In 
1965, Amin joined the Khalq Party, a s o c ia l is t  party, as an a lte rna te  
member.8 Amin was unable to  attend the meeting o f the f i r s t  Congress 
because he was in the United States working on his Ph.D. The Party ’ s 
"Congress elected a Central Committee o f eleven, seven f u l l  members and 
four a lte rna te  members, with Taraki as the Secretary General."9 In 
1968, Amin became f u l l  member o f Khalq’ s Central Committee a f te r  the 
Party s p l i t . 10
In 1967, the Khalq party s p l i t  in to  two factions, due to 
disagreements over a number o f issues, including the Party ’ s reaction to  
the Afghan government’ s termination o f the Party ’ s o f f i c ia l  pub lica tion . 
Khalq ceased in May 16, 1966, a f te r  s ix  issues were published. Taraki, 
the Secretary General of Khalq Party, and Babrak Karmal who had the post 
o f  Secretary o f the Central Committee of the Khalq Party wanted to  react 
d i f fe re n t ly  to the government’ s ac t io n .11 Karmal wanted to compromise 
with the government and assure the Afghan au tho rit ies  tha t they were not 
communists. Karmal also suggested to change the red color on the 
"masthead" o f the Khalq to a darker color. Taraki was not w i l l in g  to 
compromise since Taraki had received a le t te r  from the M in is try  o f 
Information and.Culture, s ta ting : "As your magazine e n t i t le d  Khalq has 
already been banned and since you want to issue a magazine having the 
same aims and object, you cannot be given permission to re-issue the 
same or a new paper."12
Other issues tha t contributed to the s p l i t  in the party were the 
P arty ’ s "organizational ta c t ic s :  Taraki favored a Len in is t-type party
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based on the working class, while Babrak wanted to  form a broad 
national-democratic f r o n t . " 13 In addition, the Party ’ s personal 
backgrounds; as Karmal’ s supporters had bette r educations and were 
mostly form Kabul and other big c i t ie s ,  while Tarak i’ s--associates had 
only l im ited  education, were mainly from the country, and were mostly 
non-Persian speakers.14
As a resu lt  o f such disagreements and the s p l i t  o f the Party, 
Karmal and his supporters created the Parcham Party, in 1967, under 
Karmal’ s leadership. Amin remained with the Khalq fac tion  which was 
headed by Noor Muhammad Taraki and became the second most important 
ind iv idua l in the Party a f te r  T arak i.15
Amin was the most energetic member of Khalq’ s Central Committee. 
His excellent adm inistrative s k i l l s  increased the p a r ty ’ s popu la rity  and 
brought a be tte r organization in the pa rty .16 In 1969, Amin ran fo r  
the 13th National Assembly fo r  the second time. He won th is  e lection  
and became a member o f the National Assembly from the Paghman Woluswali 
o f Kabul, and represented his p a r ty ’ s in te rests  in the Afghan 
pari i ament.17
A fte r completing his four year pariiamentary term in 1973, Amin 
focused his a tten tion  on rec ru it in g  young m i l i ta ry  o f f ic e rs  fo r  the 
Khalq p a r ty .18 In 1978, Amin played a key ro le . in  in i t ia t in g ,  staging 
and d irec t in g  the successful coup d ’ e ta t. Although Amin made the coup a 
success, and thereby brought the Afghan s o c ia l is t  regime in to  power, the 
Soviets did not appoint him as president or prime m in is ter, presumably 
the Soviets were not sure o f Amin’ s lo ya lty  to th e ir  government. The 
Russians debated between Karmal and Taraki to  head the new Afghan
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government. F ina lly ,  they appointed Taraki to  lead the new Afghan 
government.19
Later the government announced i t s  appointed cabinet members. On 
May 4, 1978, The Kabul Times introduced- the members o f the newly formed 
Democratic Republic o f Afghanistan (DRA). The paper indicated tha t the 
Revolutionary Council o f the DRA elected Noor Mohammad Taraki as the 
Chairman o f the Revolutionary Council and the Prime Min-ister o f  the DRA. 
Babrak Karmal was elected as Vice-Chairman o f the Revolutionary Council 
and Deputy Prime M inister. Amin and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, both, 
became Deputy Prime Ministers in addition to th e ir  respective 
re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  as the M inister o f Foreign A f fa irs  and M in ister o f 
Communication. The newspaper carried the photographs o f the members o f 
the DRA government. Taraki and Babrak’ s pictures appeared la rger, while 
Amin’ s p ic tu re  with the other eighteen members o f the cabinet were 
published much sm alle r.20 Although Amin was not completely forgotten 
by the Russians i t  was obvious that his leading ro le  in the coup did not 
gain him a high position in the Afghan government.
Members o f the Khalq and Parcham parties constitu ted the new 
Afghan government. The two parties united in 1977, in  an attempt to 
in s ta l l  a s o c ia l is t  regime in Afghanistan. However, in the new Afghan 
cabinet, the Khalq party had a majority. Eleven o f the twenty-one 
cabinet members belonged to the Khalq party, and constitu ted a m ajority  
in  decision making.21
Although Khalq had the majority in the cabinet, Taraki and Amin 
were unhappy about sharing authority  with the members o f the Parcham 
party. They removed Parchamis from high government positions in  order
to  assure th e ir  complete control o f the government. In July, 1978, 
Taraki appointed Babrak Karmal, the leader o f  the Parcham party, and 
several other Parcham leaders as ambassadors. Later, the Taraki-Amin 
government relieved them o f th e ir  duties and called home; but the 
Parchamis refused to  re tu rn .22
While the d iv is ion  between Khalq and Parcham grew wider the 
struggle fo r  power between Taraki and Amin also became more obvious.
From the beginning of the DRA regime Amin was eager to  gain power in  the 
government. As the Afghan M in ister of Foreign A f fa irs ,  he represented 
Afghanistan in the non-aligned summit in Havana a week a f te r  the 1978, 
coup. On his way to  the conference, Amin stopped in Moscow and met with 
leading Soviet o f f i c ia l s . 23
Amin’ s au thority  in the Afghan government was increasing. On 
March 27, 1979, Amin became Prime M in ister, but he retained his position 
as Foreign M in ister. At tha t time President Taraki held the post o f 
M in ister o f Defense.24 On July 27, 1979, Radio Afghanistan announced 
tha t Amin had added the M in is try  o f Defense to  his re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s ;  he 
was to  perform the duty o f the Defense M in is try  under T arak i’ s 
superv is ion.25
The non-stop power struggle, f i r s t  between Khalq and Parcham and 
la te r  between Taraki and Amin continued to  grow.. Amin was Prime 
M in is ter and the Head o f the Afghan Government so he formed a new 
cab ine t.25 Amin was not pleased with the way Taraki treated him.
Taraki did not wish to  pass to Amin the au tho rity  tha t went w ith the 
pos it ion  as the prime m in ister. For example, Taraki chaired the 
meetings o f the Council o f M in isters, instead o f allowing Amin to  do so.
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Amin resented Tarak i’ s handling o f the government a f fa i r s  and his 
meddling in Amin’ s areas of re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s . Normally, the President 
appoints the Prime M in ister, and the la te r  appoints his cabinet members. 
Taraki did not permit Amin to change the cabinet members.27
Amin resented Tarak i’ s re s tra in t  on his au thority  while Taraki 
believed tha t Amin was a threat to  his government. Although Taraki and 
Amin needed each o th e r ’ s support to  stay in power and to  pursue th e ir  
common idealogy, Taraki needed Amin’ s aid more than Amin needed Taraki. 
Public ly  Taraki and Amin appeared as one team. But p r iva te ly  they had 
th e ir  disagreements on running the da ily  a f fa i rs  o f the government.
They were, however, fascinated by s o c ia l is t  idealogy and wished to  move 
Afghanistan in tha t d irec tion . At that time the country was not 
prepared fo r  i t ,  and conditions were not su itab le .
Although Taraki re lied  on Amin’ s a b i l i t y ,  he also feared Amin’ s 
a b i l i t y  and found his own position in danger. He had noticed Amin's 
rapid achievements in gaining control o f the government, and thought 
tha t i f  Amin was allowed to  continue, he, himself would become Amin’ s 
next ta rge t.
According to Beverly Male, Amin’ s biographer, the re la t ionsh ip  
between Taraki and Amin "was founded on something fa r  less sentimental 
than the o f f ic ia l  h is to r ies  would, imply. 1,28 Male believed tha t Taraki 
re l ie d  on Amin’s a b i l i t y  and Amin needed Tarak i’ s support. They needed 
each o th e r ’ s support to  f ig h t  th e ir  common enemies. According to  Male, 
two o f Amin’ s prominent charac te ris t ics  were "self-confidence" and 
"unquenchable optimism.”29 Karmal described Amin’ s associates as "the 
satanic band o f Amin."30 Amin was the most b r i l l i a n t  and well
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organized member o f  the Khalq party. The Soviets were aware o f  Amin’s
a b i l i t y  as w e ll,  and had acknowledged the fac t. Alexander Puzanov
described Amin as a "strong and well organ ized..." in d iv id u a l .31
Although Amin contro lled the government a f fa i r s ,  the Afghan press
paid more a tten tion  to Tarak i’ s a c t iv i t ie s .  T a rak i’ s l i t e r a r y  works
were also broadcast on radio as well as on te le v is io n  on various
occasions. He was portrayed as an in te l l ig e n t  revo lutionary leader, a
successful p o l i t ic ia n  and a b r i l l i a n t  philosopher and w r i te r .  Taraki
might have been a successful w r i te r  and philosopher, but he fa i le d  to
end the p o l i t ic a l  turmoil in Afghanistan. In fac t,  he was unable to
make decisions on his own. He needed the aid o f e ithe r Amin or even the
Soviets to  administer the government. For example, a f te r  the uprising
in Herat in March o f 1979, Taraki was unable to  control the s itu a t io n ,
and requested Russian troops to  end the upris ing. Afghan so ld iers
joined the people against the government. Many were k i l le d  in tha t
upris ing, including a number o f Soviet advisors and th e ir  fa m il ie s .32
Taraki feared Amin’ s increasing au thority  in the government; and
was aware o f Amin’ s independent minded personality. Taraki would not
face re a l i ty  by admitting tha t Amin was con tro l l in g  the government.
Whenever Taraki had an opportunity, he had mentioned tha t he was
in s tru c t in g  Amin. His supporters also referred to Amin as T a rak i’ s
fa i th fu l  student. Thus, Taraki in his la te  December address to  a group
o f army o f f ic e rs  said;
The students we have tra ined in our party have 
cooperated with th e ir  party according to th e ir  ta le n t  
and cap a c ity . .. Our Comrade Amin is one o f the most 
b r i l l i a n t  students o f our school who has taken part in 
every regard. There is  no doubt that other fr iends 
have also taken part. Comparatively I should say tha t
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whatever plan I have given Comrade Amin, he has put i t  
in to  action very well. I am s a t is f ie d  with him and 
the party is  pleased with him.33
Clearly Taraki in his speech t r ie d  to reduce Amin’ s 
ro le  as to  nothing more than a fa i th fu l  student who took ins truc tions  
from him with no in i t i a t i v e  o f his own. However, four days la te r ,  Amin 
responded to Tarak i’ s comment during his speech in a function 
celebrating the fourteenth year of founding o f the PDPA party, at which 
he accused Taraki o f dogmatism.34
The Soviet Union did not ignore the increasingly acrimonious in ­
f ig h t in g  w ith in  the Afghan government. Rumors spread tha t Moscow was 
not pleased with the current Afghan leadership and wanted to  replace 
both Taraki and Amin.35 Although the Russians were not pleased with 
e ithe r leader, they preferred Taraki to  Amin. Taraki was more 
acceptable to the Russians than Amin, because he was more agreeable to 
most Soviets plans. By April of 1979, the Soviets were questioning 
Amin’ s r e l i a b i l i t y .  In May, 1979, Alexi Yepishov, the Soviet Union's
F irs t  Deputy M in ister o f Defence, joined Vassily Safronchuk in Kabul, to  
conspire Amin’ s removal from power.36
The Soviets d istrusted Amin believing tha t he was pro-west. A KGB 
investiga tion  found Amin to be a "smooth-talking fasc is t  who was 
secre tly  pro-western. . . 1,37 Amin, therefore, was not a fa vo r ite  Afghan 
leader o f e ithe r the Soviets or the Afghans. Amin did what he believed 
in , ignored the Soviet advisers as much as he could. The Soviets
advised Amin to  introduce gradual reform. During the early  days o f the 
DRA’ s regime, Amin and Taraki both, speeded the reforms and introduced a 
series o f rapid changes.38 S p e c if ica lly  the DRA issued several decrees 
challenging the norms and the standards of Afghanistan’ s t ra d it io n a l 
t r ib a l  society and offending the people’ s be lie fs .
Due to  the people’ s strong resistance, the government fa i le d  to  
implement th e ir  reform programs. Opposition to the government 
increased; Afghans re ta lia te d  by confronting the government in  armed 
struggle and in res is t ing  acceptance o f the reforms. The DRA in return 
introduced a regime o f te r ro r ;  the government arrested, k i l le d ,  and 
to rtu red  thousands of Afghans who opposed the new regime. Many feared 
government a t ro c i t ie s  and spent th e ir  l ives  in hiding as long as they 
could; others escaped to  neighboring countries. Moscow n a tu ra lly  blamed 
Amin fo r  the increased violence and rebe llion  in the country. Thus, the 
Soviets wished to  e lim inate Amin.
D irect ta lks  between Soviet and Afghan leaders were necessary. 
During Taraki ’ s Moscow meeting with Brezhnev in September, 1979,
Brezhnev advised Taraki to  e lim inate Amin. Taraki, aware o f Amin’ s 
greed fo r  power, w ith Moscow’ s approval planned to remove Amin.
Taraki ’ s plans to  remove Amin fa i le d  because his supporters informed him 
o f Taraki ’ s in tentions. Furthermore, since Amin knew tha t Taraki wished 
to  remove him he was extremely cautious in his actions. T a rak i’ s 
e f fo r ts  to  e lim inate Amin " in  March and September 1979, also f a i le d .39
When Taraki returned to  Kabul, the Afghan Cabinet members met in 
mid-September. At tha t meeting Amin requested a cabinet change because 
he wished to  replace the In te r io r  m in ister, Mohammad Aslam Watanjar; the
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Foreign m in is te r, Sher Jan Mazdoryar; and the Communication M in is ter,
Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi. Taraki strongly rejected the idea. Amin’ s
insistence on dismissal o f the three ministers was to weaken Taraki ’ s
posit ion  in  the government. Amin however, dismissed the three m inisters
without Tarak i's  approval and announced a cabinet change.40 As
expected, Amin’ s action antagonized Taraki. The three cabinet m inisters
dismissed by Amin took refuge in Kabul’ s Soviet Embassy.
Amin decided to change the cabinet a f te r  he learned tha t Taraki
intended to remove him from power. Sayed Daoud Taroon, who was with
Taraki during Taraki ’ s t r i p  to Havana and Moscow, informed Amin o f the
Brezhnev-Taraki p lo t  against him.41 Amin described Taraki's  plan as
the fo llow ing:
A few hours before Tarak i’ s plane was due to  land at 
Kabul a irp o r t  . . .  I learned from my men tha t a p lo t  to 
e lim inate me at the a irp o r t,  when I should be on hand 
to  greet Taraki had been hatched by Taraki himself, 
w ith the active p a rt ic ip a t io n  o f the secret police 
(AGSA) ch ie f Assadullah Sarwari, M inister o f In te r io r  
Col. Watanjar, and Communication m in ister Golabzoy....
I took immediate measures, essentia lly  .replacing 
secret po lice personnel at the a irpo rt by loyal army
men.... When Taraki saw me a live , he was very
surprised and shocked because he realized tha t I had
discovered his plan. Nevertheless he t r ie d  to stay 
calm and smiled. For security reasons I declined to 
r ide  in Mr. Taraki ’ s car on i t s  way to the 
Presidentia l Palace, and went instead s tra ig h t to  my 
o f f ic e  at the M in is try  o f Foreign A f fa i r s .42
Taraki took two days to  come up with another plan to
elim inate Amin. He called Amin and asked to meet with him in  the
Presidentia l Palace in order to  c lear the misunderstanding tha t existed
between them. However, Amin was informed by several persons including
Taroon, Chief o f the Palace Guard, tha t Taraki planned to  k i l l  him
during the meeting. Amin, not wishing to take unnecessary r isks ,
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declined the meeting using his daughter’ s i l ln e ss  as an excuse. Amin
then asked the high ranking Soviet advisors in his o f f ic e  i f  they were
aware o f the reason why Taraki desired to e lim inate him. The Russian
advisors assured Amin tha t they would investigate the matter; the
advisors, o f course, never did reply to  his inqu iry .
The maneuvering continued. On September 14, once again, Taraki
ca lled Amin and ins is ted on meeting with him to  c lear the
misunderstanding. At tha t time the Soviet Ambassador Alexander Puzanov
was also with Taraki in his o f f ic e .  While Taraki requested Amin to  meet
with him, Puzanov assured Amin o f his safety. Amin agreed to meet with.
Taraki be lieving in Puzanov’s "guarantee" o f his sa fe ty .43
A pamphlet was also published on September 16, by the Central
Committee o f the PDPA. The publication accused Taraki o f conspiracy and
a n t i-p a r ty  in c l in a t io n s , especially against Amin. The pamphlet
documented the expulsion o f Taraki, Watanjar, Mazdooryar, Gulabzoi and
Assadullah Sarwari from the Central Committee.44
Amin, however, was not reckless and took extra precautions. He
was accompanied by eight body guards instead o f the usual four. A fte r
entering the Palace, Taroon, Chief of the Palace Guard, warned Amin of
Taraki 's assassination p lo t. Amin s t i l l  believed tha t in the presence
of Puzanov, Taraki would not t r y  to  k i l l  him.45 The fo llow ing
describes Amin’ s s itua t ion :
I climbed the s ta irs  to Tarak i’ s o f f ic e .  There, the 
guard stationed before Tarak i’ s o f f ic e  door to ld  me 
tha t he had orders from Taraki not to  le t  me in except 
alone. But Tarun (Taroon), as his h ierarchica l 
superior, shoved the guard aside and preceded me in to  
Taraki ’ s o f f ic e .  As soon as he entered, shots rang 
out and Tarun was mortally wounded. By se lf-p ro tec t in g  
in s t in c t ,  I ran down the s ta irs  to reach my car while
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I heard shots ring out in my d irec t ion . My aide-de- 
camp was also mortally wounded in the shooting. Once 
in my car, I to ld  my chauffeur to drive me s tra ig h t to 
the Defense M in istry, . . .  at the Defense M in is try , I 
gave orders to  arrest Tarak i’ s p a r t is a n s . . .46
In the end, Taraki fa i le d  to  remove Amin, ins Lead 
Amin arrested Taraki. On September 16, 1979, Amin became pres iden t.47 
At 8:00 p.m. Amin broadcast a speech on Afghanistan Radio. In his 
speech Amin mentioned tha t Taraki due to health conditions had submitted 
his resignation to  the Politburo of the People’ s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) and was, therefore, unable to  continue his o f f i c ia l  
duties. The Politburo and Revolutionary Council, chaired by Foreign 
M in is ter Shah Wali, named Hafizullah Amin as the President and Secretary 
General o f the PDPA. Amin, in addition, would continue his current 
duties as the Prime M in is te r.48
Amin survived, but Taraki's condition and his whereabouts remained 
unknown. On October 3, the Soviet Counselor V i l io r  G. Osadchiy to ld  an 
American Embassy o f f ic ia l  tha t Taraki had been imprisoned at the 
Palace.49 There was no fu rthe r news except tha t he was supposed to  be 
serious ly  s ick. On October 6, Taraki was murdered by Amin’ s supporters. 
The assassination remained secret50 u n t i l  October 9, when Radio 
Afghanistan stated tha t Taraki had d ied.51 The Soviet media, in 
announcing Taraki ’ s death, quoted the Afghan news media.52 Amin’ s 
takeover may have surprised the Soviet Union. According to Safronchuck 
the Soviets had no p r io r  knowledge o f Amin’ s p lan .53
For a l l  these reasons Amin’ s d is tru s t  o f the Soviets increased 
during his presidency. As a n a t io n a l is t ,  Amin wished to  reduce his 
government’ s dependency on the Soviet Union and hoped to  gain the
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support o f the Western countries in  order to  s ta b i l iz e  his government. 
During Amin’ s one hundred and four day presidency he t r ie d  to establish 
c loser re la tions with the United States, Pakistan and some Arab 
coun tr ies .
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Soviet Invasion o f Afghanistan
Most diplomats believed tha t the main objectives o f the Soviet 
invasion o f Afghanistan were: " . . .  safeguarding the investments they 
(the Soviets) have made to  support the revolution, maintaining a 
S o c ia l is t  regime in Afghanistan, and extending th e ir  in f lu e n c e . . . "1 J. 
Bruce Amstutz, the United States Charge d 'A ffa ire s  in Kabul, based his 
assessment o f the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan on Moscow's fear tha t 
the collapse o f the Afghan government would damage Soviet prestige 
in te rn a t io n a l ly :  and Amin’ s d is tru s t  o f the Soviets would probably 
diminish the Soviet influence in Afghanistan.2
A fte r the s o c ia l is t  government gained power in Afghanistan in 
Apri l 1978, the Afghan government fa i le d  to establish a stable regime in 
tha t country. The Soviets feared tha t the f r ie n d ly  s o c ia l is t  regime in 
Afghanistan would collapse as a resu lt  of constant power struggles among 
the Afghan government leaders and the people’ s increasing opposition to 
the new regime. Afghans resented the growing influence o f Russian 
advisors in Afghan a f fa i r s .  They also opposed the reforms introduced by 
the government. Moscow could not convince the Marxist regime in 
Afghanistan to  implement gradual reforms. As a re su lt ,  the Afghan 
regime faced strong resistance from the people who otherwise would have 
supported the regime, or at least would have remained in d i f fe re n t  to  the 
Afghan government. In addition to  th is  opposition, Afghans were engaged 
in active anti-government a c t iv i t ie s  as w e ll. The Afghan government 
therefore, was unable to  implement order in the country.
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To control the s itua t ion , the Soviets advised Afghan leaders to  
broaden the government’ s base and to assign some Parchamis and non-party 
members to high government positions. In 1978, Parchamis held high 
positions in the Afghan government. The Khalqis purged the Parcham 
party members fo r the government in order To have a complete control 
over the Afghan a f fa i rs .  However, the Russians wished to see tha t the 
members o f both Parcham and Khlaq parties, become equally responsible 
fo r  government a f fa i rs .  When the Parchamis were purged the s itu a t io n  
in Afghanistan did not improve; Moscow became d is s a t is f ie d  w ith Amin and 
Taraki because they were unable to control Afghan events. Moreover, the 
Soviets observed " . . . a  gradual de terio ra tion  in the domestic pos it ion  of 
the Marxist regime . . .  and lo s t patience with Amin’ s group who refused 
to  take Soviet advice about governing the country ."3 The Russians 
decided to change the leadership and the government, i f  they had to, 
w ith one more acceptable to  the Afghan people in order to achieve th e ir  
goals o f having a s o c ia l is t  regime in Kabul.4 Moscow wished to  
replace Amin, because the Russians believed tha t the achievements o f the 
'Saur Revolution’ as they called the coup o f 1978, would be diminished 
i f  Amin remained in power. The Russians’ d is tru s t  o f Amin increased 
a f te r  Amin eliminated most o f his opponents, in 1978-79, including 
T arak i.
The Soviets had not allowed, and were not ready to  permit, any 
s o c ia l is t  government, in s ta lle d  and supported by them, to  be contro lled  
by anti-Russian elements. Soviet leaders feared tha t Amin's 
continuation in power would resu lt in the fa i lu re  o f socialism in 
Afghanistan. The e ffec t o f such a fa i lu re  could mean undesirable global
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consequences and damage to  the Sov ie t’ s in te rna tiona l prestige. In
addition , i t  was possible tha t the Soviet fa i lu re  in  Afghanistan would
lead to  some disturbances in the Soviet Central Aslan republics, which
shared the same re l ig io n  and ethnic background as th e ir  neighbors l iv in g
across the border in  Afghanistan. Soviet leaders therefore:
. . .  became apprehensive tha t the advent o f socialism 
instead o f strengthening th e ir  position in the area
was l ik e ly  to  jeopardize Russian security  and turn the
t r a d i t io n a l ly  f r ie n d ly  country in to 'a  hos t i le  
neighbor. I t  was in th is  defensive anxiety tha t 
Soviet Union contemplated the p o l i t ic a l  i f  not 
physical e lim ination o f Amin.
Moscow, therefore, considered Amin more a th reat to  Taraki ’ s 
regime than the army o f f ice rs  who revolted occasionally or the 
resistance groups who were engaged in armed struggle against the 
government. The Soviets blamed Amin and believed tha t he was 
responsible fo r  a l l  o f the country’ s troubles. I f  Amin was removed, the 
Soviets thought, peace would return to  Afghanistan. Thus, e lim inating 
Amin from the Afghan p o l i t ic a l  scene was the Sov ie t’ s main concern.
In early  1979, the Soviets began th e ir  propaganda against Amin.
An underground le t te r  d is tr ibu te d  in  Afghanistan described Amin as a CIA 
agent and asked fo r  the removal o f Amin and his associate: the le t te r  
did not include Tarak i.6 The Soviets accused Amin o f having 
connections with the CIA; and they mentioned i t  on several occasions to 
ind ica te  tha t the United States was responsible fo r  the Afghan 
catastrophe.
The anti-Amin propaganda aimed to convince Afghans tha t the 
Americans were responsible fo r  the na tion ’ s chaos. The Russians 
portrayed Amin as being a CIA agent. Russia wished the Afghans to
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believe tha t they were t ry in g  to maintain peace in Afghanistan and the 
United States was responsible fo r a l l  the disturbances in the country. 
Therefore, the removal o f  Amin would end the chaos in Afghanistan.
In early  1979, the Russians advised Taraki to  change personnel and 
to get r id  o f Amin.; This Taraki could not do; nor could the Soviets.
The Soviets not only fa i le d  to  l im i t  Amin’ s au thority , or to  remove him 
from power, they also fa i le d  to  stop Amin from gaining more au tho rity  
and becoming the strongest ind iv idual in the Afghan government. Amin, 
however, mistakenly believed tha t he could survive without Russian 
support. He ignored Russian advice, exercised his power and au tho rity , 
eliminated his opponents mercilessly and handled governmental issues the 
way he wished to  handle them. Amin was a " . . .  more independent-minded 
n a t io n a l is t  than Moscow wanted...", or could handle.8
The Russians also made numerous unsuccessful attempts to 
assassinate him; which also fa i le d . Amin gradually out maneuvered 
Taraki , purged the Parcham members o f the PDPA party, and assumed 
control o f a l l  government a f fa i rs .  Although Taraki was the president, 
Amin’ s a c t iv i t ie s  and his involvement in government a f fa i r s  placed 
Taraki in  the background. According to  Hermann Schwiesau, ambassador o f 
the German Democratic Republic to  Afghanistan, Amin was, " . . .  the strong 
man ... . ." who, " . . .  personally runs the en tire  government, co n tro l l in g  
decis ions." He also mentioned tha t Taraki, " . . .  does not know much of 
what is  going on in the country ."9
A fte r  the Soviets fa i le d  to remove Amin from the Afghan p o l i t ic a l  
scene, they decided to  use m i l i ta ry  force and change the government in 
Afghanistan. Although the Russians had the opportunity to bring in
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th e i r  m i l i ta r y  forces in Afghanistan few a months e a r l ie r  they had not
done so. Noor Mohammad Taraki had requested Soviet m i l i ta r y  assistance
from the Soviet Chief Advisor, Lieutenant General Lev Gorelov a f te r  the
mutiny in  Herat in  February, 1979, and also a f te r  the mutiny in
Jalalabad in A p ril o f the same year. The Soviets denied Taraki's
requests due to  the ir"adv iso rs ' lack o f confidence in his government.10
A few months la te r  the Russians reversed th e ir  po licy  desir ing to  use
th e ir  m i l i ta ry  forces, not to  put down the upris ing against the Afghan
government, but to  change the leadership in Afghanistan.
Amin was very much aware o f the Russians' in ten tions. He knew
tha t the Russians were t ry ing  to  eliminate him and he was able to  avoid
the Soviet inspired assassination attempts. Amin also had strong
opposition to  his power w ith in  his own government. According to
Schwiesau, East German Ambassador in Kabul, "Amin is  very a le r t  to  the
developments."11 Schwiesau fu rthe r added tha t Abdul Karim Misaq,
Finance M in is ter; Abdul Hakim Sharaie Jauzjan i, Justice m in is ter;
Dastagir Pan jsh ir i,  Public Works m in ister; and Bareq Shafeye, the
Information and Culture m in ister were a l l  anti-Amin.12
On July 18, Amin delivered a public speech expressing his
awareness o f the Soviets ’ "behind-the-scenes" a c t iv i t ie s  to  change DRA’ s
leadership. S p e c if ica l ly  a lluding to  the Soviet Union, Amin stated:
we w i l l  always be fa i th fu l  (to) whatever country we 
extend the hand of f r ie n d sh ip .. .  (and) we have not 
made a tre a ty  of fr iendship with anybody unless he has 
respect fo r  our independence.13
Regional factors also contributed to the Soviets ’ decision to 
invade Afghanistan including the f a l l  o f Mohammed Reza in Iran, the
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de te r io ra t ion  o f U.S.-Pakistan re la t ions , the hope fo r  the return o f 
Ind ira  Gandhi in India, and world acceptance when the Soviet-supported 
Cuban army began i t s  1965 African operations ( invas ion ).14 Robert 
Canfield, an Afghan scholar, argued tha t the f a l l  o f the Shah o f  Iran., 
made the invasion possib le .15
Subsequently, Moscow’ s in ten tion  of invading Afghanistan was not 
kept secrete Most countries, including the United States, knew tha t the 
Russians were d issa t is f ie d  with the ex is ting leadership in Afghanistan, 
were preparing to change the government and were preparing an invasion. 
The Soviets s ignalled th e ir  in ten tion  in advance through Hermann 
Schweisau, German Democratic Republic ambassador to  Afghanistan in  an 
e f fo r t  to  determine the a tt itud e  o f the United States and other 
countries before committing themselves to the dras tic  so lu tion o f 
invading Afghanistan. On July 17, 1979, Schweisau to ld  Amstutz tha t 
Vasily Safronchuk, Soviet Minister-Counselor had been given the task o f 
bringing about a radical change in the Afghan government. He said tha t 
the Soviets were intending a m i l i ta ry  coup and planned to depose 
Amin.16 Schweisau added that Soviet m i l i ta ry  in tervention would solve 
one problem but would inev itab ly  turn a l l  Afghans against the 
Sov ie ts .17 On September 30, 1979, Bogdan Mai basic, the Yugoslavian 
ambassador to.Kabul, also mentioned to the U.S. diplomats in Kabul tha t 
the Soviets might intervene m i l i t a r i l y  in order to e lim inate Amin.18
The Soviets' a c t iv i t ie s  along the Afghan/Soviet border were clear 
ind ica tions o f the Soviets ’ in ten tion  to invade Afghanistan. For 
example, the Soviet m i l i ta ry  a c t iv i t ie s  in the Soviet Central Asian 
republics began before the invasion. In November, 1979, the Soviets
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moved bridging equipment to th e ir  Central Asian republics and stored i t
there, across from the Afghan border.19 Anthony Arnold, Soviet
s p e c ia l is t  stated:
Marshal Sergey L. Sokolov set up his 
headquarters at Termez, ju s t  over the border 
from Afghanistan; and Warsaw Pact countries 
placed th e ir  forces on an advanced state o f 
readiness.20
Some two weeks before the invasion, the U.S.S.R. sent troops equipped 
w ith heavy weapons to  Begram a i r  base in Kabul. The U.S. did not 
protest any o f these Soviet a c t iv i t i e s .21 According to  Amstutz, the 
Soviets were s igna ll ing  th e ir  unhappiness with Amin and th e ir  plans to 
fo rc ib ly  overturn the Afghan government.22
To explain the American inaction perhaps, the U.S. believed tha t 
the Russians were not serious about th e ir  invasion plan and would not 
invade. Or the American government desired Russian embroilment in an 
Afghan c r is is  resu lt ing  in a Vietnam type war. I f  so, American 
in a c t iv i t y  encouraged the m il i ta n ts  w ith in  the Soviet m i l i ta ry  and 
c iv i l ia n  establishment.
Some U.S. spec ia lis ts  doubted tha t the Soviet Union would invade 
Afghanistan. They thought tha t the invasion would " . . .  shatter any 
remnants o f  U.S.-Soviet detente; i t  would "a lienate" Pakistan, Iran, and 
India; i t  would damage the US-Soviet arms-control negotiation; and i t  
would engage the Soviets in a lengthy war w ith the Afghans.23 U.S. 
in te l l ig e n ce , however, overestimated the Russian desire fo r  detente; 
they also excluded the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f in s ta l l in g  Karmal in power and 
believed tha t the Soviets would choose Watanjar to  replace Amin.24
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On September 16, a f te r  the palace inc ident, Amin stripped Taraki 
o f his presidency and a l l  his o f f ic ia l  t i t l e s .  Amin took control o f the 
e n t ire  government and kept Taraki captive more than two weeks. On 
October 6,-an Amin lo y a l is t  strangled Taraki. _.Although the Soviets 
d is trusted  Amin they had to deal with him because he wa_s_then the head 
o f the State. Neither could Amin t ru s t  the Russians, nor could the 
Soviets re ly  on Amin any longer. Amin was re luctan t to  involve Soviet 
o f f i c ia ls  in  government a f fa i rs ;  he t r ie d  to avoid taking advice from 
the Russians, even when he needed to. Often Amin confronted the 
Russians, sometimes angri ly . Rumors spread tha t Amin had slapped
Alexander Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador to  Kabul, during a heated
argument w ith him in Amin’ s o f f ic e .25 Amin also doubted the S ov ie t’ s 
honesty w ith his regime and knew tha t his days were numbered. Amin’ s 
e f fo r ts  to  reduce his government’ s dependency on the Soviet Union
brought about his end.26
The Soviets ’ soon realized tha t they could not control Amin and
decided to  e lim inate him as soon as they coufd. To them Amin was not
only a "power-hungry p o l i t ic ia n  o f dubious ideological conv ic tions"27 
but "Amin’ s r ise  to  power provoked an angry debate w ith in  the Soviet 
diplomatic community in Kabul."28 Puzanov suggested tha t Moscow should 
continue supporting Amin.29 Puzanov was a pragmatist; he had supported 
Taraki in  his attempts to remove Amin and was an active  pa rt ic ip a n t in 
the p lo t to  e lim inate Amin. Puzanov advised Moscow to  continue 
cooperating with Amin u n t i l  the Afghans resolved th e ir  c r is is .
Puzanov's advice was ignored. Unfortunately Amin did not t ru s t  Puzanov
and asked Moscow to reca ll i t s  ambassador.30
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I f  the Soviets could have assassinated Amin, an invasion would not 
have been necessary. The Soviets t r ie d  three times to  e lim inate Amin 
between September 14, and December 17.31 On December 13, 1979, V ik to r 
Semenovich Paputin, Soviet F irs t  Deputy M in ister o f In ternal A f fa irs ,  
entered Afghanistan to  engineer Amin’ s assassination, as well as to  
ass is t in  the invasion plan. On December 17, Paputin fa i le d  in his 
attempts and was shot by Assadullah Amin, Hafizullah Amin's nephew, who 
headed the Afghan in te ll igence  agency’. Paputin who was c r i t i c a l l y  
wounded returned to  Moscow where he died from his wounds.32 
During these la s t  c r i t i c a l  months o f his regime, Amin t r ie d  desperately 
to  secure assistance from other countries, especia lly, from the United 
States and Pakistan. Amin knew tha t without such assistance he could 
not survive. Amin, however did not gain American t ru s t  or did he 
improve his re la tions with the Soviet Union. The United S ta tes ’ 
adm in istration d istrusted Amin as much as the Soviets and thus did not 
respond to  Amin’ s repeated requests fo r improved re la t ions .
Although the DRA and the Soviet Union pub lic ly  maintained good 
re la t ions  w ith each other, in a c tu a l i ty  Amin struggled to  l im i t  the 
Russians’ control o f his government, and the Soviets simultaneously 
engaged in a p lo t  to  eliminate Amin. For example, on December 5, 1979, 
on the. occasion o f the f i r s t  anniversary o f the DRA-USSR Friendship 
Treaty congratulatory telegrams were exchanged between Amin, Brezhnev 
and Kosygin.33 Neither party admitted the h o s t i le  re la t ions  which 
existed between them. On December 24, Kabul Times quoted the December 
23, Pravda issue confirming the good re la tions between DRA and Soviet 
Union.34
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Amin made no public appearance a f te r  December 19 and moved to 
Darulaman Palace on December 20.35 A United S ta tes ’ in te l l ig e n ce  
report indicated tha t though Amin favored receiving the S ov ie t ’ s help in 
crushing anti-government elements, he wanted Afghanistan to  remain an 
independent na tion .36 Amin’ s desire to maintain Afghanistan’ s 
independent status was of course, the source o f Moscow’ s disagreement 
w ith Amin..
While Amin was attempting to secure assistance from other 
countries, spec ia lly  United States and Pakistan, Moscow was preparing an 
invasion plan. Several Russian groups entered Afghanistan to  f a c i l i t a t e  
Afghanistan invasion. Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev, (who had 
experience in the 1968 invasion o f Czechoslovakia), and General Ivan 
Grigoryevich Pavlovsky v is i te d  Kabul to  assist in  an Afghan invasion 
plan. General V iktor Paputin also pa rtic ipa ted in assassination of 
Amin.37 Hermann Schweisau, Ambassador to  German Democratic Republic in 
Kabul, also mentioned to  foreign diplomats in Kabul tha t Safronchuk was 
preparing fo r  a coup to  end Amin’ s government in Afghanistan.38 Thus, 
a f te r  a l l  the Soviet e f fo r ts  fa i le d  repeatedly to  e lim inate Amin, they 
decided to  intervene m i l i t a r i l y . 39
Moscow’ s decision to  invade Afghanistan was based on a report 
received from the KGB headquarters in Kabul. According to.Alexander 
Morozov, the KGB’ s deputy s ta tion  ch ie f in Kabul, d ire c t  m i l i ta ry  
in te rven tion  could remove Amin from power and Moscow would then be able 
to  control the Afghan government. The Soviet Politburo, in a session 
when " . . .  qu ite a few o f i t s  members were absent," passed the decision 
to  send Soviet troops to  Afghanistan.40 On October 29, 1979, the
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Soviet Politburo committee on Afghanistan met in Moscow. In th is  
meeting the members of the committee expressed th e ir  concerns regarding 
Amin’ s lo ya lty ,  his attempts to  purge the government o f his opponents, 
and his e f fo r t  to  seek a "more balanced foreign po licy " .  The Committee 
members did not t ru s t  Amin. Foreign m in ister Andre Gromyko, defense 
m in is ter Dmitri Ustinov, KGB ch ie f Yuri Andropov, and the Communist 
Party secretary in charge o f re la tions with " fra te rna l pa rt ies" Boris 
Ponomarev, signed th is  rep o rt .41
In a la te r  special Politburo session, December 12, 1979, chaired 
by Brezhnev, the Soviets reconfirmed th e ir  decision to  invade 
Afghanistan. Except fo r  Alexi Kosygin, presumably against an Afghan 
invasion, a l l  other Politburo members were present. Mikhail Gorbachev 
was a non-voting member and claimed tha t he was not consulted.42
Once the Soviets decided to invade, they planned to  use the Red 
Army because they had no confidence in Afghan m i l i ta ry  forces. The 
Soviets knew tha t they could not secure Afghan m i l i ta ry  support to  
ensure the invasion’ s success and to  in s ta l l  Karma1. Afghan m i l i ta ry  
forces in 1979, were weak, divided and disorganized; the Afghan army was 
l i t t l e  more than h a lf  o f i t s  normal size. A great number o f m i l i ta r y  
personnel had defected, been k i l le d  or imprisoned; from 90,000 m i l i ta ry  
forces .in early  1978, some .50,000 to 70,000 were l e f t . 43
What was l e f t  in the Afghan m i l i ta ry  was disunited. D isunity and 
m is trust among the remaining m i l i ta ry  personnel was s ig n i f ic a n t  and 
often resulted in bloody c o n f l ic ts  between the members o f Parcham and 
Khalq factions. Moreover, the Khalqis were fu r the r divided as to 
supporters o f Taraki and supporters o f Amin. In addition , non-party
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m il i ta ry  personnel resented the Sovie t’ s presence in  Afghanistan, wanted 
them to  leave the country and did not agree with e ith e r  Khalq or Parcham 
parties . Natura lly , under such circumstances the Soviets doubted the 
lo ya lty  o f the Afghan m i l i ta ry  forces. They therefore, brought th e ir  
own troops to  assure Karmal’ s in s ta l la t io n  in power.
December was the crucia l month fo r  the Soviet invasion o f 
Afghanistan; western countries were preparing fo r  Christmas. The 
Soviets started a i r  l i f t i n g  th e ir  troops in December. Thousands o f 
th e ir  troops were transported by a i r  and land in two days.44 On
December 24, f iv e  thousand Soviet troops entered Kabul.45 Although
Moscow knew tha t Amin was not a man whom they could t ru s t ,  and were 
preparing to  invade, they " . . .  proposed to  Amin tha t Soviet combat 
forces be brought in to  put down the re b e l l io n " .46 At the same time 
tha t Moscow was t ry in g  to convince Amin to  allow the Soviet troops to  
f ig h t  in Afghanistan th e ir  troops had already entered Afghanistan and 
more were enroute. Amin adamantly rejected the "o ffe r"  o f Soviet 
troops. As la te  as December 24, 1979, only three days before the 
invasion, the Soviet ambassador in  Kabul, once again appealed to  Amin to  
allow the Soviet troops in to  Afghanistan to f ig h t  the rebe ls .47 And, 
again Amin refused to  allow the Russians to  f ig h t  in Afghanistan.
According to  Babrak Karmal, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan 
during the second week of December. Karmal said: " . . .  the ru l ing  
People’ s Democratic Party forced Amin to  ca ll in Soviet troops during
the 2nd week o f December when he was planning to  request the
in te rven tion  of American, Chinese and Pakistani fo rce s ."48 This, 
therefore, was the manner whereby the Russians ju s t i f ie d  th e i r  invasion
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by s ta ting  tha t i f  they had not sent th e ir  troops, Afghanistan would 
have been invaded by Americans.
How did the Soviets implement th e ir  invasion plan? On December 
24, Nikolay Vladimirovich Talyzin, the.Soviet M in is ter o f Communication, 
accompanied by a large number o f his aides, entered Afghanistan and took 
charge o f the invasion operation. The Uzbek SSR’ s M in is ter o f Water and 
Resources, H. E. Jorabikov also in Kabul at tha t time states: "On 
December 27, he and Talyzin co-hosted at the In tercontinenta l Hotel a 
large reception to  which leading Afghan d ign ita r ie s  were in v ited . At 
the end o f the fe s t iv i t ie s  the guests were a l l  a rres ted ."49
Simultaneously Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The Russians k i l le d  
Amin in Darulaman Palace.50 This invasion o f Afghanistan was the f i r s t  
d ire c t  Soviet m i l i ta ry  involvement in a non-Soviet block n a t ion .51.
Moscow immediately in s ta l le d  the government o f Babrak Karmal; he had 
been in  e x i le  during the Taraki-Amin regime. Karmal appeared p u b lic ly  
on January 2, 1980. On the platform with him were General Abdul Qadir, 
Colonel Mohammed Aslam Watanjar, who had been in hiding, presumably in 
the Soviet Embassy compound during Amin’ s presidency.52 Thus, d ire c t 
Soviet m i l i ta r y  in tervention in Afghanistan ended Amin’ s one hundred and 
three day presidency.
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CONCLUSION
The coup o f 1978, tha t in s ta lle d  a pro-Soviet government in 
Afghanistan surprised the United States' government. Americans were 
confused over the nature o f the new Afghan government as to  whether or 
not the government was marxist. Although the Afghan leaders did not 
acknowledge th e ir  s o c ia l is t  idealogy, the government followed a 
s o c ia l is t  trend in i t s  po lic ies , programs and reforms. A fte r  the A p ri l 
1978 coup Afghanistan emulated the U.S.S.R. in i t s  governmental model: 
"the PDPA had a Soviet s ty le  Politburo, Secretaria t, and Central 
Committee at the national leve l, and s im ila r  bodies in local c i t i e s . " 1 
In add ition , the new leaders inv ited  a large number o f Soviets to  
counsel Afghan o f f ic ia ls  in the various m in is t r ie s .2 The Soviets also 
increased the number o f th e ir  m i l i ta ry  advisors in Afghanistan. In 
A p ri l 1978, Afghanistan had some 350 m il i ta ry  advisors, by August the 
number was almost doubled.3
Despite the great involvement o f Soviet o f f i c ia ls  in Afghan 
a f fa i r s ,  and the United S tates’ confusion over the nature o f the new 
Afghan regime, the United States government decided to  maintain i t s  
re la t ions  with Afghanistan.4 Americans, however, d id .no t i n i t i a t e  new 
economic pro jects but began to reduce th e ir  economic involvements in 
Afghanistan. Then, the unfortunate assassination o f Ambassador Adolph 
Dubs in  February 1979, led the United States to  fu r the r reductions in 
th e ir  funding o f Afghan economic pro jects. This reduction in fore ign 
aid led to  a de te r io ra tion  in the re la tionsh ip  between the two
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coun tr ies .5 While U.S.-Afghanistan diplomatic re la t ions  worsened, the 
U.S.S.R. increased i t s  economic aid to  Afghanistan.6 Ambassador Dubs’ 
murder also resulted in the evacuation and the deportation o f a large 
number o f Americans from Afghanistan.
Other problems soon developed. Although the new Afghan regime had 
the f u l l  support o f  the Soviet Union, i t  could not estab lish a stable 
government. Power struggles began f i r s t  between the Parcham and Khalq 
members, la te r  between Taraki and Amin and th e ir  fo l lo w e rs .7 Immense 
popular opposition also weakened the central government.
As a resu lt  in early 1979, the Russians lo s t confidence in the 
Afghan leaders and decided to  change the leadership. The Soviets feared 
tha t the collapse o f the s o c ia l is t  regime in Afghanistan meant the 
fa i lu re  o f the Soviet po licy in Afghanistan. To save th e ir  prestige, 
the Soviets needed a strong central government, and an Afghan leader who 
would pay more a tten tion  to  the Russians’ advice. The Soviets were 
convinced tha t Amin was a threat to  socialism, as well as to  the 
Sovie ts ’ in te res ts  in Afghanistan; Amin’ s continuation in power would, 
therefore , resu lt  in the fa i lu re  of soc ia lism .8 To achieve th e ir  
goals, the Soviets attempted several times to  assassinate Amin. For 
example, Bruce Amstutz states: "In mid-October he (Amin) had survived a 
coup.attempt tha t seemed to  combine the forces o f the extreme p o l i t ic a l  
r ig h t  and those o f the ousted pro-Soviet l e f t . " 9
Moscow fa i le d  to  remove Amin from power; instead Amin gained more 
au tho rity  in the Afghan government. The Russians c e r ta in ly  were not 
happy about the turn o f the events in Afghanistan especia lly  a f te r  Amin 
removed Taraki from power. The Soviets were determined to  remove Amin
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even i f  they had to  use m i l i ta ry  force. Why Moscow was so f ixa ted  in 
removing Amin is  unclear. Amin was a loyal s o c ia l is t  who admired the 
Soviet s ty le  o f government. He did, however, refuse to  allow bu ild ing 
o f Soviet m i l i ta ry  bases in  Afghanistan. He also denied the Soviets 
permission to  bring th e ir  m i l i ta ry  forces in to  Afghanistan to f ig h t  the 
anti-government forces. Amin was d i f f i c u l t  and stubborn in U.S.S.R.- 
Afghanistan negotiations.
Amin o f course was very much aware tha t the Soviets intended to 
e lim inate him. So, he t r ie d  desperately to  gain the support o f other 
governments, the United States o f America and Pakistan in order to 
survive. Amin hoped to convince U.S. o f f ic ia ls  tha t his government was 
sincere in  requesting improved re la tions with the United States. Louis 
Dupree, h is to r ian  and Afghan sp e c ia l is t ,  stated tha t Amin " . . .  had been 
f r a n t ic a l ly  attempting to contact the U.S., as well as Pakistan and 
other Muslim states, fo r  he realized the Russians would not support 
h im ."10 The United States, however, learning from th e ir  past 
experiences with Amin, did not take the Afghan government’ s requests 
serious ly . American o f f ic ia ls  believed tha t Amin’ s desire fo r  improving 
re la t ions  was " f a i r l y  standard."11
What should have been obvious was not. Amin was in  c o n f l ic t  with 
the Soviets but he s incerely denied improved re la tions with the United 
States. That did not mean he was not a Communist. Amin needed U.S. 
support at tha t spec if ic  moment to  save his l i f e  and his government. He 
knew tha t without the Soviets ’ support his days were numbered unless he 
received support from other coun tr ies .12 The Soviets were not 
s a t is f ie d  with Amin;13 and questioned his lo ya lty  to  th e ir  regime.14 To
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add in s u l t  to  in ju ry ,  Amin requested the recall o f the Soviet 
Ambassador.
By confronting the Soviets, Amin took a great r is k  because United 
States also did not t ru s t  Amin. The reasons fo r  the d is tru s t  were many. 
Amin was a marxist responsible fo r  the murder and to r tu re  o f thousands 
o f innocent Afghans. Would the s itu a t io n  have been d i f fe re n t ,  i f  the 
United States had assisted Amin? Would the Soviets have invaded 
Afghanistan i f  the United States had supported Amin economically and 
p o l i t ic a l ly ?  Although answers to  these questions can not be determined, 
i t  is  probable tha t Afghanistan’ s s itua t ion  would be fa r  d i f fe re n t  from 
what i t  is  today.
What should we conclude from the Afghanistan experience? Amin was 
a shrewd p o l i t ic ia n  who was not trusted by anyone - Afghans, Soviets or 
Americans. He apparently would do anything to preserve his au tho r ity .
He eliminated party and non-party members a like  whom he believed were a 
th reat to  his ru le . At the time tha t he was in trouble w ith the Soviet 
Union, he wished the United States and Pakistan to  save his government.
The United States and Pakistan especia lly, needed more time to 
evaluate Amin’ s behavior. Although Pakistani Prime M in ister General Zia 
ul-Haq agreed to meet with President Amin, the meeting did not take . 
place because the Afghan s itua t ion  changed so rap id ly . For example, 
Pakistan’ s Foreign M in ister, Agha Shahi, was scheduled to a rr ive  in 
Kabul to  meet with Amin on 22 December 1979. On tha t day a heavy 
snowfall closed Kabul the a irp o r t.  Agha Shahi ’ s v i s i t  w ith Amin was, 
therefore , postponed to  December 30.15 As the resu lt  o f the Sov ie ts ’
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invasion on December 27, 1979, Amin did not meet w ith e ith e r  Zia or Agha 
Shahi.
How should we evaluate U.S. po licy  re lated to  Afghanistan? The 
United States government was aware of Soviet in ten tions some two months 
p r io r  to  the "unexpected" invasion. Americans fa i le d  in sending a 
strong message to  "cease and desist" to  the Soviet Union in order to  
stop the invasion. R e a l is t ic a l ly  i t  is unclear whether or not such a 
message could have changed the Soviet decision. The p o s s ib i l i ty  o f Amin 
remaining in power, even with the assistance o f the United States or 
Pakistan and other Muslim nations was very slim. The Soviets had been 
deeply involved in Afghan a f fa irs  since April 1978. They were in 
control o f major government operations in Afghanistan. For the 
Americans to acquire a s im ila r  degree o f knowledge and involvement in 
Afghan government a f fa irs  they needed time, at least a year with 
complete Afghan government cooperation. Amin’ s lo y a lty  to the U.S. 
government was very much in question. His goals were not American 
goals. He needed U.S. support only to save hfs government not to  serve 
American national in te rests  in Afghanistan. Amin’ s days were numbered; 
he survived as long as he could. With or without the American 
cooperation Amin’ s destiny was already drawn by the Soviets; he had to 
go.
Moreover, when Amin importuned United S ta tes ’ aid, i t  was already 
too la te . Only during the early part o f the 1979 when the Soviets 
signaled th e ir  d issa t is fa c t io n  with Afghan leadership could the U.S. 
e f fe c t iv e ly  and d ip lom atica lly  intervene. While the U.S. received the 
message the government did not respond by s ig n a ll in g  i t s  opposition to
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the Russians invasion plan.
Then again, the Soviets ’ invasion date, December 27, assured th e ir  
success. Americans were celebrating national and Chris tian holidays 
from November 25 onward. After...Jhanksgiving Day Americans were involved 
in Christmas preparations. I t  is  a busy, .month and almost everyone 
concentrates, exclusively, upon Christmas and New Year’ s celebrations. 
Also, during th is  holiday season many plan more_vacation days in order 
to  extend th e ir  celebrations. Thus the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan 
may have surprised many Americans who did not learn o f i t  u n t i l  a f te r  
the holiday season.
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